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INTRABLOC

Yugoslav Source Discusses Romanian-Hungarian Tensions

21000023 [Editorial Report] The Pristina daily RILINDJA in Albanian, organ of the Socialist Association of Working People of Kosovo, publishes a four-part series of articles under the general heading "National Conflicts in the Birthplace of Dracula," by Maroje Mihovillovic, in its 15, 16, 17, and 18 July issues, on pages 13, 21, 17, and 17 respectively. The first installment, entitled "Down with the Bulldozer Policy!," deals with Hungarian protests against the Romanian "sistemalizarea" campaign, which "has levelled 6,500 villages where Hungarians live." The second installment, entitled "The Great Nicolae-Elena Policy," presents the history of Transylvania, the Treaty of Trianon, and the role of the Russians in returning Northern Transylvania to Romania in 1947. The third installment, entitled "Purges in the Fanks of the Intellectuals," reviews Romanian actions and statements dealing with the Hungarian minority, and the final installment, "Hungarian Pupils Cannot Be Instructed in Their Mother Tongue," concentrates on the events leading to the Kadar-Ceausescu meeting in 1977, the open letter to Ceausescu from the former Romanian official Karoly Kiralyi, and the exchange of attacks in the Hungarian and Romanian press.

HUNGARY

Stumpf on Youth Movements; Views New Social Model

25000234c Budapest OTLET in Hungarian
30 Jun 88 pp 14-15

[Interview with Istvan Stumpf, by Ervin Csizmadia: "Dialogue About Youth, With Istvan Stumpf, Political Scientist"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text]

[Box, p 14]

Istvan Stumpf was born in Sarospatak in 1957. Graduated from the Law Faculty of Lorand Eotvos University in 1982. After receiving a diploma in sociology from the Faculty of Philosophy in 1985, worked as assistant professor in the Department of the Theory of Government and Law. Since 1986, staff member of the [MSZMP Central Committee's] Sociology Institute. Since 1983, director of the Law Students' Specialized Residence Hall; also responsible editor and member of the editorial board of SZAZADVEG, a publication devoted to social theory. His most important fields of research are youth's prospects of attaining leadership, and the questions of the relationship between the political system and youth organizations.

[Question] Mainly since the mid 1980's, autonomous social initiatives have produced almost sudden changes in our entire social structure: society, which earlier was believed to be motionless, is making itself heard on more and more issues and is organizing alternative collectives. A widely held view is that these motions can be interpreted as phenomena resulting from the crisis of socialism's earlier system. Does the crisis situation adequately explain the cause of autonomous (and mostly youth) initiatives?

[Answer] I would cite three causes to explain the emergence of such initiatives. The unquestionably decisive cause among them has been the crisis of socialism's earlier, Stalinist model, respectively of this model's improved and modernized version. Another cause has been the inadequacy of the earlier mechanisms of socialization, which has long kept away from politics the recent oncoming generations. The KISZ has played a decisive role in this process, by its scant success in ensuring youth's meaningful participation in politics during the past decade. We should add, however, that this has not been the fault of the KISZ alone. But the essential thing is the basic experience common to successive oncoming generations: that the system's ability to deliver is limited or has become exhausted. Consequently, it is natural for youth to want to create independent organizations and institutions, to practically regenerate the civil society that the earlier, totalitarian political structure did not tolerate. The point, of course, is not that autonomy would be created instantly, merely from realizing that official socialization is unsuitable. This is a lengthy, conflict-ridden learning process, but the only way to form individuals and collectives able to express their interests, let them clash and project values.

The third and final cause is that the future has become uncertain. This affects the present young generation the most, because it is they who will have to bear the further consequences of the present crisis situation at least for three or four more decades. It is already fairly obvious that the state is neither able nor willing to solve a good many problems; this inevitably reinforces the demand for society's autonomous forces, and will reinforce it even more in future. I am convinced that mainly the civil society which youth is reviving will provide the foundations of a new social model.

[Question] Why has youth's activation occurred specifically in the 1980's? Why was this not possible, say, in the 1970's? Whereas then there was a great need for a more self-organizing society not to let the reform process peter out?

[Answer] I would start out from the fact that formation of the KISZ created the official channels for youth's participation, but these channels became perfunctory after a while, specifically by the late 1970's. Initially, in the 1950's and 1960's, membership in the KISZ gave wide strata of our youth a sense of identity. In the 1960's,

for example, membership in the KISZ also meant commitment to reform. In the 1970's, however, the party already adopted resolutions that did not permit the formation of alternative youth organizations.

The significant difference between the 1970's and the preceding period was that socialism's youth base was being reproduced on a diminishing scale: the youth organization's appeal among youths definitely began to decline. A contributing factor to this was the fact that the reform process's rollback narrowed considerably also the KISZ's scope: in following a party that was not quite in what you might call its reform period just then, it was necessary to abandon also certain self-reforms. I will mention merely two significant consequences of this setback. First, with the decline in the possibilities and opportunities to engage in real politics, there grew up generations that hardly learned systematically the most elementary techniques of engaging in politics, of challenging and debating contrasting opinions. Secondly, the cream of the young people drew away from the KISZ; they were unwilling to accept positions of leadership, specifically because of KISZ's narrowing scope.

[Question] But by now the KISZ has also formulated its program of self-reform.

[Answer] Indeed, the orientation that calls for radical reforms of the political institutions has emerged also within the KISZ during the past few years. By this I mean reforms that could make the KISZ a relatively autonomous organization. For it is obvious, and in my mind one of the main lessons of the present autonomous youth movements, that youth today has already turned away from organizations whose autonomy is limited. I believe that the KISZ will again appeal to youths once it is able to show its independent aspect. During the past few years the KISZ has demonstrated with several very noteworthy drives and measures (Our Future Is at Stake, retrenchment, and the housing concept) that it is taking radical reforms seriously also for itself. But Hungarian youth cannot be denied the right to have youth organizations of its own. This is at least as important as the fact that the party has its youth organization.

[Question] A decisive question in the case of alternative or autonomous youth groups is how they relate to the existing political system. These days one hears with increasing frequency that anything is permissible if it is not specifically prohibited by statute. Most of the autonomous movements, too, have been organized on this principle.

[Answer] The mentioned fundamental principle is truly the point of departure in every constitutional state. In other words, the burden of proof rests not with the citizen, but with whoever challenges the legality of the citizen's action. In Hungary, however, this would require many changes. Also in the perception of the role of the law, for example. For up to now the law has been mostly an instrument of power, and practically anything could

be done with it. Specifically the autonomist movements are the ones that are trying to gain acceptance also of interpreting the law from society's viewpoint, in the sense that the law must provide guaranties against abuses by the state. The law must define rules of behavior that protect the citizen's sovereign behavior. Regrettably, this normativity has been dismantled in our country in recent decades, and violation of the norm in particular has become the general rule. It is a task of fundamental importance, I believe, to rehabilitate the law's behavior-influencing role. It would likewise be unfortunate, of course, to overestimate what the law is able to accomplish. In my opinion, however, unambiguous normative legislation, which is not merely an instrument of political power, would reinforce society's autonomy.

[Question] Is there any systematic classification of the frameworks within which the mushrooming autonomous movements arrange themselves?

[Answer] I find that three levels can definitely be distinguished. The first category comprises the groups, clubs and associations for hobbies, sports, cultural and other recreational needs. The various local community-reinforcing organizations (e.g., for the preservation of traditions, municipal landscaping, and environmental protection) are in the second category. In the third category belong the initiatives of high political quality, formed to represent and solve national issues. Essential in these initiatives is that for society they are ensuring to an increasing extent the three basic principles indispensable to the functioning of modern societies: direct participation, democratic or corporative representation of interests, and pluralism of party policy.

[Question] This last principle sounds rather suspect in the context of Hungary's political system.

[Answer] Nevertheless the various clubs, associations and societies that are functioning contain already now the seeds of party policy. In my opinion, we should not be afraid of this. These autonomous initiatives are extremely important fields for training our youth and entire society, specifically because they are initiatives from below. In addition, they incorporate also the most progressive traditions of Hungarian history, to mention merely the populist, socialist, and bourgeois radical traditions. These associations must be judged on the basis of their contributions toward the development of more complete, more autonomous political standards, and eventually toward a higher level of the pluralism of party policy.

[Question] Is it possible to differentiate among the various spontaneous social groups on the basis of their degree of organization and the social significance of the movements?

[Answer] The environmental groups, the students' specialized residence hall movement, and the club movement are the most advanced in terms of deliberate social activism. There is also a born-again religiosity, and various basic collectives are forming in quick succession to represent it. But I do not think that it would be worth while to attempt to rank them in any way, because they all stem from the same root, in the sense that they all are working to forge a base for radical reforms; or, from another aspect, they all are urging the development of the already mentioned normative legal system. Somebody once said that the role of alternative collectives is similar to that of pain in the body: they indicate the presence of strains and boils. Pain alone does not yet mean that a body is not viable. Therefore the primary objective is to reconcile the power structure's demand for stability with the dynamics of the autonomous movements, rather than to remove the "ulcers" by surgery.

A new sphere for movements is unquestionably developing. For movement in the past was practically synonymous with being official, whereas today's alternative initiatives have assumed the nature of movements. However, all this does not yet mean a movement at the national level, and especially not a national reform movement. But reformers are present wherever anything significant is taking place, and this is an extremely promising development.

It is also true that mainly educated intellectuals are participating in these movements and aspirations, but participation today is not limited by any means to intellectuals. For example, the so-called entrepreneur movement is attracting young skilled workers as well as farm workers in the provinces, and is now in the stages of gaining also political representation of its interests. The big problem is not really whether or not these are movements of intellectuals, but what is the situation of the disadvantaged and multiply disadvantaged youths whom also society tends to view with prejudice? They are hardly able to defend themselves; others have to protect them for the time being. The role of autonomous social and religious groups is invaluable also in this process.

[Box, p 15]

Editor's comment: "Debate on Youth"

Today's younger generations were unable to enjoy the blessings of the period of economic prosperity. On that we agree.

But they are experiencing directly the inherited drawbacks, and the uncertainties that accompany every transformation but, hopefully, will be of short duration. Perhaps we agree on that, too.

But so far as the other questions of assessing the situation and finding a way out are concerned, opinions are divided even in the debates within our own editorial

office itself. Sometimes there is only a shift in emphasis, and sometimes even the points of departure differ. Then how can we expect an "agreement of views" from a wider sample? In our political life, which is becoming more colorful, everyone is seeking a solution, how to extricate ourselves. In ways that sometimes are entirely different.

The interviews that are being held will inform the reader about these well-intentioned attempts that are "arguing" even among themselves.

1014

KISZ Struggling To Be Relevant, Heard
25000234a Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in
Hungarian 11 Jul 88 p 3

[MTI article: "Giving Answers to Life's Big Questions"]

[Text] The KISZ Central Committee met on Saturday [9 Jul 88]. It heard a report on the MSZMP Central Committee's 23 June session and the timely questions of domestic policy; debated and approved a progress report on implementing its 27 Sep 87 policy statement, and also a report on implementing the tasks formulated at its leadership's meeting with the Council of Ministers in December of last year; decided what to do with the unspent balances of the 1987 budget allocations for the KISZ bodies and institutions, and for the Presidium of the Hungarian Pioneer Federation; and then went into closed session. Imre Pozsgay, minister of state and a member of the MSZMP Politburo, also attended the KISZ Central Committee meeting and was one of the speakers.

The first speaker was Csaba Hamori, a member of the MSZMP Politburo and the first secretary of the KISZ Central Committee. Briefing the meeting on the 23 June session of the MSZMP Central Committee, he emphasized that—in the interest of implementing the tasks formulated in the MSZMP national conference's policy statement—the MSZMP Central Committee has requested the party's youth organization to submit proposals for new, modern principles and forms of party control over the KISZ; for adapting the KISZ's organization, activity, methods and means to the new tasks; and for developing the KISZ's system of relations, with special attention to the tasks stemming from providing broader opportunities for youths to organize themselves. The party has also requested its youth organization's help in renewing the party's work methods; in outlining the party's policies on employment and distribution; in modernizing the principles of science policy; in drafting a policy statement on social policy and the development of health care; and in elaborating the concept of a new cultural policy.

Csaba Hamori was also the speaker who outlined the proposal to convene a KISZ national conference. He emphasized that the Communist Youth League wants to participate in the turnaround. It must concern itself

primarily with how it can help this great political and social restructuring, and it has to provide an answer as to how it will transform itself to conform to the changing domestic political balance of power. He underscored the fact that the forecast of youth's social adjustment is worse than ever before, boding great social tensions in the coming years.

Even after the party conference, neither society nor the party at large is really taking seriously the comments of the KISZ. This is why a KISZ national conference will be important for the party, society, and the youth movement as well. The conference can decide about convening the KISZ Congress, perhaps as early as 1989.

The contributors to the debate fully agreed that a KISZ national conference is necessary, but opinions differed rather widely on just what the agenda of the conference ought to be. Someone said that KISZ membership has been declining steadily, and the national conference ought to explore the causes of this decline.

Peter Kiss, first secretary of the Budapest KISZ Committee, argued that [the KISZ national conference] ought to analyze whether the organization is able to find answers to the many questions that have arisen, and whether it can and will be bold enough to put the answers into words.

In his speech Imre Pozsgay emphasized: "Perhaps specifically the party conference has created more favorable circumstances and conditions to prevent KISZ initiatives from being stifled by a lack of interest, from becoming lost and vanishing from society's view. With its very exciting, noteworthy and important initiatives during the past year or two, the KISZ has called attention to several basic social problems. Yet the sociopolitical impact of these initiatives has not been as great as their proponents would have liked. I see the causes of this not in the KISZ itself. The causes are to be found in the sociopolitical situation and crisis, and in the underlying defensive behavior of the MSZMP, the cumbersomeness of the ruling party's vanguard behavior, and the responsibility of its leadership for the situation that has developed in this country. In other words, the initiatives originating in the KISZ and other youth groups, the clever, progressive and reform-minded ideas have been lost in politics, in the political environment, in the public indifference generated by the loss of confidence, and not in the KISZ itself."

Speaking of the cooperation between the government and the KISZ, Imre Pozsgay explained: "In my opinion, the form of cooperation that has evolved between the government and the KISZ, and which promises to be meaningful, should be maintained, made more dynamic, and placed in the context of a peculiar conflict-handling world. The government, by virtue of its position, approaches a given social reality in a different way and

from a different aspect, than our youth, the passive party to the same social reality. I will cite merely one example: The government in any event must be prepared for the absence of a significant rise in national income during the consolidation phase. Thus if today various social groups are demanding preferences or so called priorities in certain areas, the government too must accept conflicts and act consistently when redistributing national income. Over and above its objectives, the government must make clear also the extent of its determination to pursue them. I think that if it comes to conflicts over the redistribution of national income, then the government must favor progression in its decisions pointing toward consolidation and serving to stabilize the economy. Which in the given case also means that the government must provide openings and opportunities for advancement, to the social groups that could be the most active vehicles of this progression or consolidation. Which means that in redistribution our youth must be among the first in line, rather than among the last. In other words, here also the government will have to show some courage and identify sooner or later the industries, and together with them also the social groups, it intends to aid already in the phase of consolidation. The government has to bear this mentality in mind, and in this mentality it has to state unambiguously who will get the green light for action and initiative, and how will society, respectively the government, compensate those who will be afflicted by the consequences of the turnaround in economic policy."

On the basis of Csaba Hamori's motion and the subsequent debate, the KISZ Central Committee decided to convene the KISZ national conference for this autumn.

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Stumpf To Head New National Youth Organization

25000234b Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 13 Jul 88 p 3

[Text] Hungary's Law on Associations is to be revised, and the role of voluntary public associations rethought.

In line with this, the representatives of voluntary public organizations, movements and independent groups met on 11 July in the headquarters of the PPF National Council and decided to form a National Council of Hungarian Youth [MIOT; Magyar Ifjusag Orszagos Tanacs] by the end of October.

The conferees elected a preparatory committee, headed by Istvan Stumpf as its chairman. The members of the committee are: Imre Nagy, a secretary of the KISZ Central Committee; Mrs Istvan Davoti, chairman of the SZOT [National Council of Trade Unions] Youth Committee; Dr Andras Zsohar, chairman of the TOT [National Council of Agricultural Cooperatives] Youth Committee; Attila Begany, secretary of the PPF National Council's Council on Youth Clubs; Miklos Blanckenstein, a Roman Catholic priest, secretary of the Catholic Youth Movement; Bertalan Diczhazy, leader of the 405

Club; Janos Palotas, secretary of the National Association of Entrepreneurs (Economic Chamber); and Attila Weber, political staff member of the PPF National Council.

The conferees instructed the preparatory committee to draft the bylaws of the National Council of Hungarian Youth, and its rules of organization and procedure.

The preparatory committee requests that proposals and comments regarding the bylaws and rules of organization and procedure be sent to the following address: MIOT Preparatory Committee, 24 Belgrad Rakpart, 1360 Budapest, V.

The Student Federation—the federation of student self-governments and independent circles—held its conference on 9-12 June. The conference was open to the public. Several delegates of the Budapest and provincial student councils had been invited, as well as the secondary-school students who have long been attending the meetings of the Student Federation. Staff members of the KISZ Central Committee and Executive Committee had likewise received invitations and were present.

The Student Federation adopted its rules of organization and procedure, and elected its leadership.

1014

Editorial Bemoans Lack of Parliamentary Democracy
25000219b Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian
4 Jul 88 p 1

[Text] Public openness and the strengthening of democracy characterized the three working days of the summer session of the National Assembly. While last year representatives decided about the personal changes of government in a closed session excluding all publicity, this year not only journalists and guests could be present at the procedure of electing the new state officials, but, through live TV broadcast, the whole country could witness the events.

This openness was useful. Those interested in public affairs could see that the representatives made decisions with responsibility and thoughtfulness, and gave their opinion sincerely—and sometimes passionately—even about the most sensitive issues. It is also useful that the favorable reaction to the open discussion of personal issues will, perhaps, reassure those disinclined for publicity: the prestige of socialism will not be harmed if people know who received how many countervotes. On the contrary, this is a part of democratic public life, and can increase the citizenry's knowledge about the country's affairs and thus strengthen their ties to their country.

This session also revealed the defects in the conditions for the strengthening of parliamentary democracy. The single microphone wandering around among contributing representatives not scheduled to speak was on the verge of ridicule. Not only microphones were missing, though, but also the naturalness of reaction with which the representatives' comments—unplanned in the chairman's script—should be received. Otherwise there would not have been blunders such as when the parliamentary official chairing the session forgot to put some of the representatives' recommendations to the vote, or when the chairman forgot to ask the assembly whether from now on they really wanted three vice-chairmen instead of two.

Democracy is to be studied by representatives, too. They should not suggest things contrary to house rules. They should also learn to express their thoughts briefly, concisely and based on good arguments; they tend to phrase them too verbosely. Public opinion hopes that not only the National Assembly's convention hall will be technically better equipped in the near future, as it was announced, but also our way of thinking about the Parliament's role. It is to be hoped that the planned modification of the house rules will serve this purpose.

One of the experiences gained during the session is the strengthening of the widely shared demand that parliamentary representatives who are members of the trade union movement should use the forum of the National Assembly even more to transmit the mood and opinions of the workers and to represent the interests of the trade unions' membership with their speeches. The chief secretary of the MEDOSZ [Trade Union of Workers in Agriculture and Forestry] and the general secretary of the Komarom County Council of the Trade Unions even voiced this demand. It is a pity that they did so only in the course of chats in the hallways during the breaks and not in the convention hall in the presence of fellow representatives and state leaders.

Because there would have been plenty to be said by the trade union movement both in the report about last year's income statement and the debate following the ministerial report about the industrial change of structure. For example, that the very necessary balancing of the budget and the inevitable cutting back on state support of deficit-producing production cannot be envisioned in the way it has been done so far. Further increasing the tax squeeze and an increase in the inflation similar to this year's are not the way to go, because no more burden can be put on the population. Even now there are too many people struggling to survive.

That's why it is a justified claim—coinciding with the goals of the trade union movement—that was voiced by several representatives: the government should have a consistent policy of deflation, i.e., a controllable, specific program that fights the dangerous devaluation of the

forint. The government officials in charge should create a suitable action program to assuage the tension due to unemployment created by the cutback in state support for companies in the red.

This session of our Parliament was crucial, perhaps more crucial than the earlier ones. Both speakers and contributors said that although last year's budget performance was better than planned, this was not the result of lasting processes, but of the reduction of living standards and a further increase of the already high state debt. It is a warning sign that the earning potential of the economy has not improved adequately. The ministerial reports and contributions drew a visible picture of the two neuralgic points of the Hungarian national economy: the weakness of export capacity for hard currency, and the effect of state support for deficit-producing production which distorts the production structure. These neuralgic points should be cured with consistent and good therapy as soon as possible.

According to the agenda, the Parliament discussed last year's results and the experiences of the industrial structure. In every sentence, though, there was a strong tone of responsibility for the fate and future of the Hungarian people and readiness to act. There was the recognition that it is no use to lament, keep explaining things, and searching for scapegoats. That it is no use to keep analyzing the situation forever and waiting for someone to tell us in what direction to go. The economic and social renewal and thus the fate of the country is in all of our hands. This session of the Parliament helped translate this recognition into action.

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POLAND

Reformers View Bilateral Relations on Eve of Gorbachev Visit

26000493 Warsaw PRAWO I ZYCIE in Polish
No 27, 9 Jul 88 pp 1, 5

[Articles by Jozef Kaleta, Mikolaj Kozakiewicz, Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski, and Adam Zielinski, under the general headline "Poland-USSR: Do We Need Each Other?"]

[Text] [Editorial Comment] Perestroika has been going on in the Soviet Union for three years; Polish attempts at reform have a longer history. Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Poland will therefore be a visit with the leader of a country that is changing, in a country that is also—but perhaps with fewer results—attempt to adapt to the modern world. This places our mutual relations in a new light. Instead of the "brotherly friendship" declared from high positions in past decades but not always reflected in reality, are new areas and forms of cooperation emerging? Are Poland and the Soviet Union bound to each other out of necessity or because of common interests? Do we need each other at all?

Our writers attempt to answer these questions

There No Longer Is an Alibi

[Article by Jozef Kaleta, director, Department of Finance, Academy for Economics in Wroclaw]

The visit of Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev to Poland will undoubtedly be a momentous political event. The Polish people have great hopes for this visit. From public opinion research conducted in Poland, it is evident that M. Gorbachev generally enjoys enormous influence and that the perestroika and glasnost he inspired should have a major impact on the future of our reforms as well.

Yet how much has changed in the recent past; not that long ago the Soviet Union was the perfect alibi for opponents of reform in Poland. They used to say that the Soviet Union allowed Hungary some partial reforms because it does not know the Hungarian language, but we would not be allowed any reforms, even though we might want to introduce them.

Today there is no longer any doubt that political and economic reforms are being implemented in many areas in the Soviet Union much more radically and consistently than in Poland. This is the case, for example, in the struggle with the bureaucracy, the main obstacle to reform; in the field of personnel policy, especially at the central level; foreign policy; economic policy, also in foreign relations; cultural policy; candor and openness in the media and the party's attitude toward government bodies and state administration.

These significant transformations in the Soviet state and its economy cannot fail to have an impact on our country, especially since they have brought the Soviet Union enormous achievements. Political reforms have radically improved the world's attitude toward the Soviet Union and strengthened its prestige in international opinion, while economic reforms have also contributed to a significant increase in agricultural production (by tens of millions of tons of grain annually) and to a major increase in the share of consumer goods production as part of total production and, as a result, improvement in the supply of consumer goods to the population. The Soviet Union's three years of experience prove irrefutably that constantly threatening the Polish public with the negative effects of reform by its opponents is unwarranted.

I think the Soviet Union can also benefit from our many years of experience with reform, and in particular become firm in its conviction that ostensible, partial and uncomprehensive reforms can never produce anticipated results. Also instructive for the Soviet Union are the consolidation of our opponents of reform and their effective retardation of all reform processes, especially since these struggles have a history of more than 30 years here.

M. Gorbachev's visit to Poland should also contribute to a fundamental turning point in our economic relations with the Soviet Union and to significant development and increased efficiency in our economic cooperation, in which both countries are interested. The Soviet Union is a particularly attractive trade partner to us, if only because of our proximity and the ability to purchase in the Soviet Union raw materials that are crucial to us, and above all because of the unlimited ability to export our production to the USSR. The whole world is competing for Soviet markets today and numerous Polish and foreign firms are settling in Poland, mainly because of the Soviet Union's proximity and the major opportunities to export to Soviet markets.

Finally, both countries are interested in continuing to remove "blank spots" from our history. This is also one of the very important conditions for bringing our nations closer together and tightening true Polish-Soviet friendship.

A New Opportunity

[Article by Mikolaj Kozakiewicz, deputy at large, Sejm]

What binds Poland and the USSR? Do we need each other?

There was a long period when Polish-Soviet friendship and alliance were likely to be presented in terms of feelings or frankly positive emotions: friendship, if not outright love, admiration and gratitude, attraction and affection. In relations between state and international relations, these categories, derived from emotional relations between individuals, are absolutely useless, while between countries that for centuries have had an account mutually encumbered by various resentments, they cannot be used even figuratively without evoking a feeling of discord and falsehood.

Is it not more honest and convincing to say that the basis for Polish-Soviet relations after World War II and the main adhesive for our alliance is not free choice and love but hard necessity and business? Because in any coolly calculating mind there can be no doubt that as a result of past geographic and cultural changes in the world, there exists between our countries a profound and diverse interdependence. And we need not defend ourselves against this interdependence, but we must oppose turning interdependence into dependence, which has also occurred in the most recent history of both countries.

Considered economically, the USSR is our biggest trade partner in the sense of receiving our production as well as in the sense of supplying fuel, raw materials and investment materials. Interrupting this exchange would deal a fatal blow to the entire economy. Considered militarily, we have lived for nearly a half century without war, free from major concerns about our borders, due exclusively to the protective shield of the Warsaw Pact.

Anyone who does not understand this understands nothing. And on this our fundamental national interest is based and, as we approach the end of the 20th Century, there is no other alternative for it, especially in today's Europe, divided into opposing blocs. Yet we too constitute an exceptionally important element of the Soviet Union's *raison d'etat*. Lying in a strategically and politically sore point of Europe, in the very center of the corridor where aggressive armies from the West repeatedly surged into Russia and later the Soviet Union, we are very important to the sense of security of the Soviet peoples and state. We are also demographically (and potentially militarily) the most numerically strong member of the European socialist countries; we have the great potential of highly qualified personnel and the greatest reserves of natural resources of all countries (besides the USSR). An internally rich and peaceful and strong, sincerely allied Poland lies in the intelligently conceived interests of the Soviet Union.

I feel the perestroika occurring now in the Soviet Union under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev is creating particularly favorable conditions for taking full advantage of bilateral benefits in keeping with the most profound interests of both countries. In its reform impulses Poland has usually been in heretical positions or positions of those fossilized ideological dogmas that prevailed at that time in so-called real socialism. It is no surprise that internal and external pressures soon hindered those reform efforts. Today, for the first time, the changes in Poland and the Soviet Union are moving in a common direction and giving each other reinforcement and new growth impulses. This is a completely new, hitherto unknown situation which we cannot underestimate. It is also a great opportunity to fortify significantly the ties binding our nations and societies, despite numerous historical animosities and long standing grievances, which should not be disregarded but which also should not be overrated. Because one cannot go forward with one's sights fixed continually backward, in the past. This does not apply only to relations with the Soviet Union, but in this case, it is especially timely.

Much Must Still Be Changed

[Article by Mieczyslaw Rakowski, member, Politburo, secretary, Central Committee]

There is no exaggeration in saying that for several years the entire world has looked with wonder and often with amazement at the Soviet Union and carefully noting the changes taking place in it. Today perestroika is as durable a concept as the computer, satellite television, etc. The same is true for another Russian word—*glasnost* or openness. Both contain an enormous wealth of subject matter.

The Polish public is also among those who are closely observing perestroika and the substance it carries with it. The development of the situation in the Soviet Union since the April plenum (1985) has been followed with

particular attention in the ranks of the Polish United Workers Party. This stems not only from the ideological ties binding the Soviet Communist Party and the PZPR, from the friendly relations uniting both countries, but also, or perhaps mainly, from the path we chose at the Ninth Extraordinary Congress. I would note that it was then, in July 1981, that we acknowledged initiating reform of our system in three main areas—economic, social and party—as necessary and historically warranted. Despite highly unfavorable circumstances in the fall of 1981, the commission on economic reform, with several hundred members, set to work. In that same year the Sejm passed the law on creation of employee self-management, which today is already an important, influential structure in the system of socialist democracy. The creation of employee self-management was the first step on the way to generating a political system in which producers occupy a primary rather than a secondary position in the socialist state. On 1 January 1982 we began instituting economic reform, which produces conditions for releasing the initiative and enterprise of individuals and all of society. In following years, we took important steps on the way to reforming our socio-economic system. We created such new institutions as the Sejm's Socio-Economic Council and the Constitutional Tribunal and we made visible progress in the field of freedom of speech and the press.

I do not intend to write the history of our reforms. My only point is to emphasize an extremely important fact, namely that socialist renewal, proclaimed at the Ninth Congress and ratified at the PZPR's Tenth Congress, in its main premises and above all in the goals it has set for itself, is consistent with Soviet perestroika. Of course there are distinctions dictated by specific national, economic and cultural traits, but above them rises the reform concept, the common conviction that a great deal must still be changed in practically existing socialism for it to become a social system that will ensure maximum use of the creative forces lying dormant in man and create conditions for him to live in dignity.

For Poland and its future, for the PZPR, the unity of purpose for which reform forces in both countries are striving is an event of historic significance and consequences that must also be measured on a historic scale.

One more aspect of the changes that have affected the Soviet Union and our country. The struggle against conservative forces, against passivity and indifference, as well as against resistance to what is new and progressive, requires mutual support. But not verbal, not declarative support. The point is to build facts that will fortify reform forces in both our countries. To make it perfectly clear, every victory won in Soviet perestroika strengthens reform forces in Poland. And vice versa. And every setback, every failure in Soviet perestroika and Polish renewal weakens the advocates of reform here and there as well.

We Tell Each Other the Truth

[Article by Adam Zielinski, member, Consultative Council of the Council of State, and chairman, Lawyers Association]

The history of Polish-Russian and later Polish-Soviet relations has proceeded—as we know—variously. We had a period, strictly speaking up to World War I, when numerous quarrels, wars and finally slavery prevailed. There were, admittedly, bright moments. But one cannot fail to notice that from those times such concepts as Siberia, czarism or the partitions have entered the Poles' history primer. The 20-year period between the wars was not very auspicious either. Indeed, the creation of a mutual tradition of workers' parties did begin. But in state life, rather unfavorable elements prevailed, including the 1920 war. Familiar events associated with the beginning of World War II also have remained in our memory.

The next period was the period of People's Poland: cooperation, ideological connections, the struggle for peace in Europe and the world, the tradition of the common fight against Nazi fascism. This period also had its shadows. Together we endured the difficult time of Stalinism.

And finally the modern period. A time of sensible balances and revolutionary reforms, a time to tell each other the truth and not avoid tough issues, in which not only institutions and structures are renewed, but friendships as well. One must look at this time with great optimism. After all, so much unites us!

First of all, our neighborhood. Mickiewicz complained about those who can find only enemies in every neighborhood, while Piotr Skarga recalled that it is good to love one's neighbor. Further, the benefits arising from common action. Here one could quote the words of Zeromski, that in the modern world, the solitary mean nothing. It is worth adding that the point is friendship with a superpower that can be an effective guarantee of our existence and independence. Among the peoples of the USSR, Slavs predominate. So we also note the words of Ansyk about the need for "inviolate harmony among Slavic brothers." Finally, the ideological bond arising from the building of socialism in both our countries.

Thanks to Soviet perestroika and to changes in People's Poland, we are now saying openly that also so much binds us, we also have our own interests, our own needs and our own experience.

I will not talk about the benefits of cooperation in areas about which I know less, although it would not be irrelevant to recall with whom Wokulski, who amassed a great fortune, traded. I will talk about law.

Poland is more to the west than the Soviet Union not only in geographical terms. For decades Russian law was binding on our soil, but so was Prussian, Austrian, French, and even Hungarian law. From this period we took with us a certain special, legal-comparative way of thinking. So Poland can, in a rather natural way, become a place for the confrontation of numerous viewpoints and numerous schools of legal thought. I will point to just one field. Today discussion on the law, the rule of law, including human rights in particular, is occurring in all socialist countries.

Let us recall that Polish legal tradition has always grown out of great respect for the position and dignity of the individual, often—as we know well—beyond the bounds of harmony with the public interest. Today we are returning to many intellectual concepts. In any case, the world has changed. For example, not that long ago the French Declaration on Human and Civil Rights was discussed as an instrument that enacted the bourgeois ideological concept with all its defects. Currently the Polish Lawyers Association is joining with the Soviet Lawyers Association in commemorating the 200th anniversary of the Declaration on Human and Civil Rights, seeing in the declaration a great step on the way to protecting the legal status of the human individual.

I think we can be attractive to our Soviet partner as a country that is seeking new alternatives in this field, having established the Supreme Administrative Court, the Constitutional Tribunal, the ombudsman institution and recently having led to the creation of the Public Committee on Human Rights, which emerged on the inspiration of the Polish Lawyers Association.

The Soviet Union, in turn, can be very useful to us for other reasons. For example, a legal system is being constructed in the USSR that is more closely connected to specific principles. It is worthwhile to compare every alternative, even the most effective temporary one, with these principles. Secondly, the Soviet Union as a world power on a much broader scale must adapt its solutions to world trends, including regions of the world where Poland is found less frequently. Moreover, the USSR itself, as a country with many nationalities, is a place for reconciling thoughts, concepts and traditions which we do not encounter in Poland. So these experiences can prove to be very useful to us.

A final comment. We still know too little about each other. About our legal solutions, about discussions occurring in legal circles, about good and bad experiences from particular legal solutions. Of course, this cannot be merely a simple statement. A conclusion must be drawn from it. We need each other, so let us get to know each other better!

Lopatka on Evaluating State's Role in Line With Democratization

26000509 Warsaw *PERSPEKTYWY* in Polish
No 21, 21 May 88 p 14

[Interview with Adam Lopatka, member, Central Committee, and first president, Supreme Court, by Ryszard Swierkowski: "The Administration Is Not the State"]

[Text] There exist different ideas on how we should develop mechanisms of democratic rule, although the idea itself of democracy meets with quite popular and unequivocal approbation. Thinking about democracy involves consideration of its various aspects and how they rank in importance. We interviewed First President of the Supreme Court, Professor Dr Adam Lopatka, about the need to revalue the concept, the role, and the operating mode of state bodies in connection with the process of democratization.

[Question] Professor, sir, in your interesting speech at the Sixth PZPR Central Committee Plenum which dealt with, let us recollect, problems of the further development of socialist democracy, you referred to the question of rationalizing and limiting the scope of tasks performed by state bodies. You commented that the related recommendations oversimplify the issue.

[Answer] Indeed, that is how I had assessed them. For the machinery of state consists of various kinds of bodies and organisms. We must ask what should be rationalized and what curtailed within that machinery. The health of the state requires a balance among the discrete kinds of state bodies.

[Question] The predomination of some at the expense of others causes a situation which political scientists sometimes term the asymmetry of power relations.

[Answer] And it is precisely in the history of People's Poland so far that that balance has been lopsided.

[Question] It can be readily guessed that you are referring to domination by the administration and the bureaucracy.

[Answer] The government and the administrative bodies have been overdeveloped while at the same time we were sensible of an underdeveloped status and importance of the Sejm, the council of State, and the people's councils, that is, of representative bodies. The role of the agencies for the administration of justice has been and remains underestimated.

[Question] What you say could be controversial or at least elicit doubts. After all, some people identify administration of justice with the repressive agencies.

[Answer] That is a cardinal error. The courts should not be mistaken for the repressive agencies. They are the foundation of justice and in this sense they operate as a

shield for citizens against all those who in various ways and under various guises encroach upon civil rights. And this also means, if the need arises, against other state bodies.

[Question] In mentioning the administration of justice among the underestimated state bodies did not you perhaps subjectively exaggerate the issue, considering that this involves you personally as president of the Supreme Court?

[Answer] If I did not hold this office, I would still propound the same point of view. For the issue has unusually important consequences; the lack of a proper balance of powers among the kinds of state bodies mentioned above has also been one of the causes of abuses of power. The government and the administration have not shown sufficient restraint.

[Question] The report to the Sixth Central Committee Plenum on the growth in the standing of the Sejm and other representative bodies contains many important statements and political directives. But it says less about the administration of justice, and especially about the courts.

[Answer] It mentions an important issue, namely, submitting economic disputes between entities of the socialized sector to civil courts. And it also refers to expanding the oversight powers of the Supreme Administrative Court with regard to administrative decisions as well as to the right to sue against refusals to register associations. This should not be underestimated, and it markedly upgrades the importance of the courts. However, we still lack an overall concept of a higher standing of the bodies for the administration of justice in the state than at present. And in my opinion that is an immeasurably important matter.

[Question] I think it is worth recalling here that the resolution of the Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress placed a strong emphasis on these questions. And I also think, on reading today the corresponding passage in that resolution, that so much is yet to be accomplished. Let me cite just part of one sentence which represents as it were a general directive: "Stressing the need to strengthen socialist legality and absolutely implement its principles, the congress supports increasing the authority of law and of the law enforcement bodies...."

[Answer] The courts cannot be viewed in the same way as other state bodies. They are needed not only as unquestioned oracles of law and justice. They must also represent a high moral authority. Citizens seek judicial protection—also when they feel that they were not properly treated by other state bodies. This alone points to the quite exceptional role of the administration of justice in the system of the state, the role of a representative of the society rather than of the authorities. Thus, our thinking about the state has to be extensively revalued. Administrative bodies should be curtailed while,

I repeat, representative bodies and the administration of justice should be strengthened. By the same token, the process of democratization will be strengthened and broadened. Because, while protecting the interests of the state, the administration of justice represents in its own way the most deeply conceived interests of the nation.

[Question] The centralist-bureaucratic model rested above all on the assumption that the interests of the society are best represented by the state administration. It knew "best" what the nation wants. The consequences are known.

[Answer] A good administration is indispensable. We must remember the bad historical experiences. But a "good" administration means one that is precisely subject to oversight by representative bodies and is a servant of the public. The administration is not the state, and neither is the government the state.

[Question] Precisely. My attention was attracted to the following passage in your Sejm speech: "The model being currently developed should have no room for a crisis of the state. On the other hand, a crisis of the government would be difficult to preclude. For in the entire apparatus of the state it is the government that is most exposed to stress situations."

[Answer] My opinion is that in assuring a proper balance of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches we strengthen the bonds between the state and the society, reduce to a minimum the danger of abuses of power, and eliminate the possibility of the repetition of a situation in which a government crisis became a crisis of the state.

[Question] Does not it rather seem that the excessively frequent changes in the legal system which we have been witnessing in the last few years hardly promote strengthening the standing of the administration of justice?

[Answer] The courts need, of course, stable legal foundations, and changes of the legal system should be confined to the indispensable minimum. Legal regulations should be introduced wherever they serve as an effective instrument of action. Yet we are indeed observing a constant and unrelenting trend toward revisions of law, including revisions of nearly all the law codes. It is time for us to appreciate the advantages of the stabilization of law, to cease viewing the legislative business of the Sejm or other bodies as praiseworthy. Also worth bearing in mind is the view that the older law is the better. Not every political change in a given field requires a change of law.

[Question] But politics or perhaps more correctly the life of the society, its model, or its system, is nowadays undergoing such radical changes, not only in Poland besides, that they entail far-reaching changes in all other domains of life without exception. It can hardly be otherwise, cannot it?

[Answer] I perceive this question as a proposal for viewing the changes from a corresponding perspective. Justly so. It is clear nowadays, not only in Poland but also in the USSR and other socialist countries, that the model of socialism formed in previous years and termed Stalinist has ceased to be effective. However, a new model has not yet been precisely defined. The concept of perestroika, glasnost, acceleration, and new thinking proclaimed by Mikhail Gorbachev is as yet in its incipient stage, and its overall shape and effects are to become apparent only early in the third millennium. In implementing the policy of socialist renewal it has to be assumed that the new society is emerging from the old in the course of a prolonged historical process. The strategy of renewal must therefore combine adherence to fixed principles and values of socialism with bold answers to current needs of life.

In this historical situation the judicial system faces the necessity of protecting the values reflected in the legislation so far. However, it cannot remain blind to the fact that the laws in force are more or less viewed as not corresponding to the needs of the current stage of renewal. Allowance has to be made for the new hierarchy of values and the growing new legal awareness.

[Question] Especially considering that both the program for developing democracy and the program for implementing the second stage of the economic reform envisage yet another and long list of legislative changes.

[Answer] Work has been initiated on not only a reform of the decrees governing economic and social activities but also on amending the Constitution and all the law codes (except the family law code). This means essentially that the entire legal system of the Polish People's Republic has been placed under a question mark. For these changes are to affect the foundations of that system.

[Question] I heard that proposals for major reforms of, among other things, also the property law are being made.

[Answer] Indeed, new kinds of property will appear. Soon now communal property will be constitutionally affirmed. Consider also that, e.g., our law is extremely protective about job security. However, the needs of development, economic changes, labor discipline, and freedom to choose work, cannot be met unless, unfortunately, that protection is markedly curtailed. Standing guard over legality, the judicial system is deeply rooted in the life of the society. In undergoing changes, this system participates and shall continue to participate, in its own manner, in the process of the transformations encompassing all domains of collective life.

[Question] Thank you for the interview.

Academic Favors 'Social' Socialism, Talks With Opposition

26000490a Warsaw KONFRONTACJE in Polish
No 5, May 88 p 2

[Interview with Mariusz Gulczynski, professor, political systems of capitalism, Institute of State and Law, Polish Academy of Sciences, and member, editorial council, KONFRONTACJE, by Marek Goliszewski]

[Text]

[Question] Professor, what is happening in our country?

[Answer] The method used thus far in overcoming the crisis, i.e., a half-measure that is too slow, inflationary and inconsistent is compromising itself totally. It is a half-measure because it encompasses only part of the necessary changes in the methods of management without changes in the structures of management which places us in the international division of labor as a raw material-pig iron backup facility. Constant changes in statutes, ordinances and resolutions do not lead to new, clear rules of the economic game. Social dissatisfaction with this method of reforming appeared. And in the beginning—not, at all, with strikes. The first indications came from the Public Opinion Research Center in, among other things, a report on the "Dissatisfaction Spiral." At that time, only 7 percent of the population believed in the reform. Strikes were the most dramatic symptom of this discontent. They did not have a program or counter-program but were primarily an expression of frustration.

[Question] In that case—what now?

[Answer] In my opinion, there are two variants in which the situation can develop. The first is to continue the half-reform without allowing fundamental changes in the structure of the economy or in the system of economic power.

[Question] Only economic?

[Answer] This, of course, is linked to the sphere of politics treated as a way of settling economic, social and public issues. Therefore, the first variant means continued low efficiency and the continuation of management at the expense of the public and not according to their needs.

[Question] What does this lead to?

[Answer] Undisputably to social tension and—I would risk saying—to transforming Poland into a European version of Afghanistan, admittedly without civil war but with something in the line of constant clashes between the police and the rebels.

Further on—to the domination of the centers of authority by the advocates of that which is outdated in economic and political structures, and consequently, to the elimination from the game, of socialist powers consistently pro-reform oriented.

[Question] And the second variant?

[Answer] The central point of the second variant is the creation of a broad, national Anticrisis Pact that would bring together all those who understand the tragic aspect of the situation and are ready to treat as secondary that which divides so as to unite in the defense of our common, national values. This Pact will fulfill its role if it ties into the experiences and principles of the people's democracy between 1944 and 1948, of course, without repeating current mistakes.

[Question] Which means?

[Answer] Within the sphere of the economy, this means the recognition of the equality of four sectors: individual (mainly farmers), private, cooperative, and state. Within the sphere of politics: the legalization of the opposition that accepts constitutional realities. Within the sphere of ideology: taking into account a broad world outlook and various options as to the directions of Poland's future development.

[Question] Will this not be construed as turning away from socialism?

[Answer] Undoubtedly, this will be a departure from administrative socialism but only so as to create conditions for the development of social socialism.

[Question] I would like to return to the Pact—who with whom and on what basis?

[Answer] The foundation of the Pact must be a program that will take into account the broadest spectrum of various ways of thinking. It would be a bad beginning to create it from a meeting between the leaders of the opposition with the directors of government centers. This could end in a battle for political concessions. The first stage of forming the Pact should be a meeting of authoritative representatives of various lines of thinking acknowledging that none of them have a monopoly on being right and ready to outline together the economic and political program of the Pact.

[Question] Reservations are appearing. What I have in mind now is a part of the opposition—that it does not have the conditions for deliberating, that the authorities are not making any gesture for dialogue, that conservatism....

[Answer] Proreform forces in the government camp and in the opposition camp are not capable of dominating conservative powers separately. I am saying this with full conviction and this must be taken into account by the

advocates of the kind of position you are talking about. Only the combining of these forces, mutual support without the loss of their individual identities can create chances for consistent reformers to gain influence over the economic and political program and practice. Waiting for appropriate conditions or gestures will lead to nowhere.

[Question] Professor, specifically: when, where and with whom could you meet?

[Answer] As soon as possible, that ought to be understandable, and in a place accepted and proposed by my partners. I am ready to accept every proposal of a meeting.

[Question] How do you see the role of the opposition in socialism?

[Answer] It is an objective fact. Thought should be given to what ought to be done so that it will function constructively and not destructively. Experience proves that the best solution is legalization, of course of an opposing element that accepts the constitutional framework. I believe that this pertains to an overwhelming part of today's opposition.

[Question] What would this legalization be based on?

[Answer] This is a process that undoubtedly requires time. The point of departure could be associations and political clubs that reflect the objective pressure for recreating the situation from the years of the people's democracy which I already mentioned. The natural outcome of this would be the crystallization of a broader coalition of the governing forces within the sphere of legal political life.

[Question] What about trade unions?

[Answer] I am for union pluralism but according to social roles and positions and not political options. I am in favor of separate trade unions for laborers and other workers who are directly involved in production and services as well as separate trade unions for administrative and supervisory workers.

[Question] What will socialism gain from your proposals?

[Answer] The chance for genuinely strengthening itself. First of all, through the effective elimination of the old, artificial crust of administrative socialism which compromises and blocks possibilities of reform and social progress. Secondly, the chance for gaining supporters and allies, particularly among the younger generation; among those discouraged toward socialism for as long as it appears mainly in this outdated form; among the young generation that, nonetheless, accepts the humanistic values that this political system carries. Thirdly, through the concrete socialization of both ownership and

authority. Fourth, by regaining attractiveness owing to the concentration of socialist forces on the struggle for the humanization of development, the creation of a civilizational alternative both for capitalism and for the antiquated version of socialism.

9853/08309

Legalist Argues Need for New Constitution
26000514 Warsaw *PRAWO I ZYCIE* in Polish
No 29, 16 Jul 88 p 3

[Excerpts from a paper by Kazimierz Dzialocha, director, Institute of State History and Law, University of Wroclaw, delivered at the plenary session of the Board of Directors of the Association of Polish Lawyers]

[Text] The matter of the amending the 1952 Constitution of the PRL already has a long history both in the political life of the country and in the study of law and opinions of legal circles in general. The discussion goes back to 1956-57, the times of the Polish October and in fact—despite a lack of political inspiration in the 1960s, for example—it has never died out.

The basic conclusion of this discussion, mainly within the study of law, is an opinion on the need to work out and ratify a new fundamental law that continues the socialist line of development of the Polish nation and state under new conditions.

This conclusion, in the form of systematized arguments for a complete change in the present constitution and the need for promptly undertaking work on the provisions of a new one, was contained in the "Report on the state of law" of 1985. As we know, the report's position coincided with discussion at the Tenth PZPR Congress and the decision of that congress, opening new prospects for making constitutional changes, although their scope was not precisely determined.

In the discussion on the range of the changes, two positions stood out: the first in favor of working out a new constitution, the second promulgating the advisability and possibility of holding to a partial change (amendment) in basic law.

Generally speaking, the arguments in favor of the first position, e.g., complete modification of the Constitution of the PRL, predominated when one considers both the significance (weight) of the arguments and the number of speakers. I would note that the Tenth Congress of the Association of Polish Lawyers [ZPP] advocated the passage of new constitution. I would also like to say that nearly all the participants in a very interesting and lively discussion that took place at a meeting of the ZPP's committee on constitutional law on 6 May of this year spoke in favor of this position.

What until recently was a timely dilemma—pass a new constitution or amend the current one—was ended at the political level, in my opinion, by the resolution of the Seventh Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee, which favored the first alternative. It was ended because other parties and political groups (PRON's Second Congress, the ZSL's Tenth Congress) spoke in this vein, and it settles—one might presume—the dispute within the PZPR.

The position of the Seventh Plenum takes into consideration the predominant argumentation of legal circles, including the legal sciences. For some of this circle—and not only for it—this decision may be controversial and discussion will continue to some extent, especially since skeptics can cite the precedent that even an analogous resolution at the party's Seventh Congress (in 1971) on the matter of complete reform of the constitution was quickly subject to change. That is why I would like to offer my own opinion as to which arguments—mainly legal—speak for passing a new constitution, not amending the present one.

I. The constitution of the PRL is the oldest socialist constitution (if one does not count Hungary's thoroughly amended constitution of 1949). More importantly, it originated under the influence of concepts that are not timely today and that were basically discarded years ago in socialist science and practice. It is a document that is declaratory to a great extent, mainly with a balancing, more propagandist, political function than a legal one. Despite a series of amendments, including that of 1976, it has basically kept its original defects, which hinder its fulfillment of its function as fundamental state law (its legal function). From this point of view, particularly faulty is the structure of the constitution's forms, expressed is the excessive generality and ambiguity of its provisions and legal gaps that are difficult to execute when applying interpretive rules.

Because of the constitution's fragmentary and, to a great extent, improvised purpose, amendments cannot eliminate these formal structural defects, but rather would intensify them through incohesive regulation. All this hinders significantly the range for direct application of constitutional norms—which is one of the basic requirements of contemporary socialist constitutionalism—and for the fundamental law's stimulating effect on the development of the entire legal system.

II. As a result of changes to the PRL's constitution, which were a means of applying its provisions to new needs in the field of government organization and functioning and of dealing with new trends in socialist constitutionalism, there was a certain clash between former principles and institutions—influenced by the concept of the constitution prevailing in socialist doctrine at the time of its adoption—and new solutions. The latter signify a revaluation of earlier opinions on the function of the state and the law, especially the role of the constitution in the life of the state and nation.

In the provisions of the PRL's constitution, it is as if two different concepts of the socialist constitution met, which certainly is not conducive to the effectiveness of its influence on public and the civilian legal awareness. A fundamental change in the constitution is necessary, based on a uniform, cohesive concept, determined both by the requirements of social and political relations and the state of the national awareness of Poles.

III. The development of political life and ordinary legislation in Poland during the time the PRL's constitution has been in force far outdistanced the substance of many provisions of fundamental law. While it did not make the basic assumptions contained in it less timely, in many instances it gave them a new, richer substance, but one that was still not in harmony with the outlines of the constitution. Meeting the requirements of its balancing function would require supplementing the current catalog of principles or developing them on the basis of the evolution of political and legislative practice.

The legislation of the 1980s has generated particularly important consequences in this regard, with laws on economic reform and social self-management in the forefront (compare the latest amendment to the constitution—municipal ownership).

The inadequacy of the substance of the constitution in relation to the changes that have occurred in the sphere of legislation, including the formal faultiness of constitutional norms, also generates negative consequences for the further development of this legislation. Because of numerous gaps in the PRL's constitution and even its total lack of bases for forming the substance of laws, more and more often laws that are *praeter legem fundamentalem* are passed. As a result, in the field of this same discipline of constitutional law and its individual parts (i.e. in parliamentary law) an independent system of statutory law and "material" constitutional law, not completely conditioned upon the constitution, is being formed. By not including in the constitution legislative achievements of recent years in particular or the important, lasting rules of political practice, further legislative action is threatened with an ever more obvious loss of a cohesive, leading concept determined by the primary principles of the system.

IV. The creation of the Constitutional Tribunal does not rule out the need to work out and pass a new constitution for the PRL and justifies it all the more for specific reasons. The Constitutional Tribunal undoubtedly has an effect on increasing the authority of the constitution, especially its significance in establishing a system of sources of law through its giving the constitution's often unclear and narrow provisions a specific, cohesive substance and can also serve to make current legislative activity conform to those lines of development that will be better suited to the general premises of the system contained in the PRL's constitution, even considering its faults and shortcomings, regarding both the substance and form of the present constitution. The tribunal has

limited opportunities for action to optimize the constitution's legal function if it is desired that the legal character of that body, warranted by important systemic considerations, not be violated.

V. I would like to add to this legal reasoning (formulated, incidentally, in 1985) a different argument, of an ideological nature, drawn from observation of the development of socialist constitutionalism in recent years, including Polish constitutionalism. In my opinion, the argument about the close union between constitutional changes and the main stages of the building of socialism, the argument that every stage of the development of society through socialism and communism corresponds to its own, qualitatively different constitution—as maintained by B. Toporin—has not been proven in practice. Far-reaching categorical determinism is more an expression of 19th Century "Systemdenken" or longing for the operation of some unrealistic law of Newton in the social sciences than a correct interpretation of historical materialism. Nor does it have much in common with political practice.

Marxist classicists always cautioned against such schematism, stressing that social changes are actually an independent factor but not an exclusive one, and they influence the field of political and legal institutions not directly, but through changes in the ideological sphere, in the state of social consciousness. In addition, the phenomena of political and legal life etc. are characterized by a defined autonomy in relation to the socio-economic base. As we know, the main substance of every constitution are questions of authority, of political relations.

The question arises—are we dealing, in Poland, Hungary and recently in the USSR, with new changes of an essentially different nature that have been forming for several years (earlier in Hungary, as regards the economic sphere)?

I am prepared to agree with Prof S. Zawadzki, that economic and political changes in the Soviet Union and Poland (and in Hungary), under the watchwords of "restructuring" and "renewal" signify an entry into a new phase—of a qualitative, revolutionary nature—within the socialist formation, which must make for a thorough reinterpretation of the basic values of socialism and lead to fundamental changes in the theoretical and ideological basis of the constitution as fundamental law.

And if this is the case, then everything is in agreement with the general correctness of constitutional changes as the expression of socialist doctrine on society.

Changes of both an economic and political nature speak in favor of a new constitution for the PRL. In my opinion, one can also interpret the resolution of Seventh Plenum in this way. Because the resolution reads that there should be in the new basic law an expression "of the comprehensive, profound changes occurring in our country." These changes increased in the period after the

party's Tenth Congress and that is why the evolution of the party's position on the scope of constitutional changes in relation to resolutions of the Tenth Congress should come as no surprise.

It is sometimes mentioned in discussions that the changes taking place cannot be fixed in a new constitution because we are just now dealing with the initial period of a potentially new phase in the development of the socialist system, that this phase is still in the nascent state. Such an attitude essentially means renouncement of the constitution's stimulating role, which supports development in a particular direction and direct development of the entire legal order in accordance with it. In other words, it means acceptance of only its balancing, conserving function—which is an expression of diminishment of the constitution's role, already rejected by socialist doctrine in the 1960s.

I feel that after settling the matter that we should have a new constitution, the entire effort of the legal community should be concentrated on pursuing its form: both its general legal concept and the form of individual principles and institutions of the system. In this second matter, the deciding vote will no doubt belong to political and governmental authority; however, in the field legal science and the legal community has its own opinion, which should be given a hearing. On the other hand, in the matter of the general concept of the future constitution, legal science and lawyers, in my opinion, should be of fundamental importance. The goal of legal science should be to work out a persuasive position on such questions as a) the functions of the future constitutions in the life of the state and nation, especially its legal function; b) the objective scope of regulation of the new constitution; c) the structure of constitutional norms; d) constitutional guarantees; e) the procedure for ratifying and amending the constitution and f) constitutional methods.

As we know, for some time work has been proceeding on the theoretical bases and socio-economic conditions for changing the PRL's constitution directed by Prof S. Zawadzki. The detailed program has been published by the professor in the latest issue of PANSTWO I PRAWO.

But the question arises—should this work, by nature mainly theoretical, be supported and supplemented by working out and distributing a constitutional poll that would survey the opinions of the entire legal community on the question of the form of the new constitution or material selected for it. Or perhaps not just the community of Polish lawyers. Of course, this is not a new idea in the constitutional practice of modern states and it was suggested several years ago by constitutionalists in connection with the announcement of changes to the PRL's constitution.

I find support for the notion of such a survey—whose purpose and form must be thoroughly thought through—in the Seventh Plenum's resolution that work on a draft of the new constitution should be carried out in accordance with the requirements of openness of inquiry and extensive dialogue, in the spirit of national understanding and socialist coalition.

12776

Local Election Issues, Voter Reaction Discussed

26000501b Warsaw ODRÓDZENIE in Polish
No 21, 21 May 88, pp 1, 13

[Article by Jagienka Wilczak: "Some Don't Want Democracy"]

[Text] "Why is that supposed to be an experience?" wonders Andrzej Rykowski, secretary of the Tarnobrzeg Voivodship Electoral Collegium.

"After all, we had clamored for democracy, have not we? So now we got it and let us use it."

Formerly it was impossible, but now it is: the new electoral rules permit establishing single-seat districts.

People at the collegium say that, as a result, in Tarnobrzeg Voivodship were formed 87 single-mandate districts for elections to the voivodship people's council and 602 for elections to basic-level people's councils—more than in any other voivodship. They also say, "Since we term our government democratic, let it be so in practice too. But that in itself takes plenty of skill."

Had the rules not been changed, 55 gminas could not have been represented in the councils, but now there are safeguards for representation by every gmina. This should attract interest and increase voter attendance.

The old style is no longer acceptable, and this means that social awareness and customs must be thoroughly changed. For example, there is the custom of voting with unmarked ballots. That was voting, but that was not electing. But now it is time to elect, and there is no way of electing without marking the ballot.

Jozef Pietrzak, secretary of the PRON [Patriotic Front for National Rebirth] Voivodship Council, declared, "We tried to bring councilmen closer to voters and vice versa, so that anonymous outsiders about whom little is known except posted age, education, origin, and affiliation, would not be elected. This is too little. An anonymous councilman is not accountable for anything to anyone. Now things should be different and the councilmen should be known to the community and feel obligated to the people they know and look them in the eye." Secretary Pietrzak referred to the resolutions of the Second PRON Congress, which he views as initiating it

all, since they postulate establishing single-mandate districts. And resolutions exist in order to be implemented, especially when they are just and expected social resolutions.

The line of the least resistance could have been followed by sticking to multimandate districts, since this halved the work and required fewer preparations. The previous elections in Tarnobrzeg Voivodship took place in 511 districts and required a crowded schedule and plenty of work, whereas this year the elections will occur in 1,153 districts and the schedule is so crowded that it is bursting at seams and trying human endurance, because it is tighter. But they say, "We are not complaining. We got what we wanted—unprecedented electoral laws.

"But Democracy Is Costly

...and demands sacrifices. It is only to the naive that it seems to fall from a tree."

The best people were given an opportunity, and now everything depends on the voter's pencil.

A. Rykowski explained, "The Cooperation Commission distributed the mandates among the parties and social organizations authorized to nominate candidates. The three main political parties, the PZPR, the United Peasant Party (ZSL), and the Democratic Party, retained 52 percent of the mandates. The remaining mandates fall to nonparty councilmen. After all, everywhere in the world the ruling political party influences the distribution of mandates. Yet the PZPR already relinquished two of its mandates to the voivodship people's council in response to suggestions." These mandates were received by nonparty candidates. In practice this happened as follows: comrades from the Cooperation Commission specified the districts for which they wanted their own nominees. A. Rykowski claimed, "We exerted no pressure. We allocated the mandates only after the names of the candidates were known." Now election officials are anxiously awaiting the elections to occur: in several instances there have been clashes between party and nonparty candidates or between PZPR and ZSL candidates. "We shall see," says Secretary Rykowski, whose regular job is that of an apparat staffer, director of the Organizational Department of the Voivodship Committee, "How our people defend themselves."

And since we are speaking of experiments, this is viewed as an experiment.

It was expected that finding candidates would be a problem. Malicious tongues wagged about street raids to catch candidates and enter them on the slates. As was known, the councilmen were rather impotent [bardziej bezradni niz wladni]. The reasons were many, but the principal ones were the financial limitations: the councils were helpless because they were not provided with sufficient funds. Best intentions were not enough, since money was lacking. This impotence causes discontent

among voters and lack of faith among councilmen. It spoils the mood and at the same time it relieves individuals of responsibility by serving as an excuse for incompetence, sluggishness, or lack of interest. This time it is to be different; the councils are to get funds of their own, and control them, by taxing the industrial plants operating within their administrative boundaries. In addition, they will be able to obtain investment loans, if they deem them necessary. Such are the predictions.

In Tarnobrzeg they asked, "Fine, but what about the councils in areas where there are no industrial plants? There, the councils will be, as before, broke and dependent on dole from 'the top.' Another question: will not parochialism prevail over the interests of the gmina or the voivodship as a whole? People have to get used to all these innovations. And how can they get used to them considering that until now they have been continually held in apron strings, censured, pressured, manipulated, and intimidated, and for decades deprived of having a say, while the councils have been a sham facade and their powers an abstraction? How can people be expected to know how to write when they do not know the alphabet? It has been announced that this time it will be different. Councilmen are to be protected by parliamentary immunity. According to Secretary Rykowski, such announcements resulted in a greater number of candidates for councilmen than had been expected—3.5 candidates per mandate. The innovations have already proved themselves. Public meetings at which the right to nominate candidates was granted resulted in many nominations.

But some people declined to accept the nomination. Most often they were the incumbent or previous councilmen. However, they were not on an overwhelming majority: 8 to 10 percent of those nominated had declined.

A. Rykowski said, "We had rules for nominating candidates on behalf of the PZPR, as approved by the Central Committee. The Executive Board of the Voivodship Committee confirmed three to four candidates per seat and offered their names for public consultation."

Nonparty People Had It Easier

The names of all the nominated nonparty people were offered for public consultation.

The Electoral Collegium rose to the occasion: overnight it determined the slates of candidates.

Sometimes they themselves had to use voters' pencils. For example, when a gmina chief wanted to become a candidate for a basic-level people's council. Why should the duties of a gmina chief, a legislator, and a member of the executive branch be combined in one person? Or when an employee of a gmina office wanted to become a candidate—that would be nonsensical, as he would then have to decide on his own tasks during the council's term

of office. Likewise, secretaries of gmina party committees were viewed as undesirable candidates: why should they want still more power? Such a combination of offices does not appear felicitous, since these secretaries already have the right to take the floor during the sessions. But there also were some people who thought this afforded a chance to do some manipulating: for finding arguments in favor of getting rid of candidates who are popular in the community but not with the authorities. Afterward, ideology can always be tailored to facts. For example, a public meeting nominated two party-member teachers, but the party instead proposed three farmers. The names of the teachers were deleted and, following its own rules and the recommendations and suggestion of the local gmina party committee, decided that instead those three farmers would compete for the mandate. The Executive Board of the Voivodship PZPR Committee used the argument, "We want the authentic worker-peasant class to be represented in the councils. If they were to compete with white-collar workers, the farmers would easily lose and the same kind of paperpushers would remain in the council."

Of course, the decision of the Executive Board was the compelling argument. It has that right.

J. Pietrzak argued, "Retaining the voivodship slate [of appointed candidates] should be no ground for worry. It accounts for only 10 percent of the candidates." The arguments in favor appear logical: the continuity of the council must be preserved, the recommendations and postulates are being implemented, and pretending that we are facing the deluge would not be the best way out.

Attendance at Meetings Is the Proof of the Pudding

In Stale Village, Grebow Gmina, attendance was the same as practically everywhere else: some 30 people gathered in the gloomy hall of the Fire Department Building. Most of them were regular candidates as well as those named on the voivodship slate. The others were invited guests, the gmina authorities, and a member of the Electoral Collegium.

Grebow Gmina presented 165 candidates for public consultation. On 19 June 50 members of the Gmina People's Council will be elected. Of the members to be permanently elected from the district and voivodship slates, five are candidates for the basic-level council, and one for the voivodship people's council.

The Tarnobrzeg voivodship deputy governor was to attend the meeting, but he did not arrive. He did not explain why. This really outraged those present. His arrival was demanded owing to a painful village problem—the construction of a school. For 20 years this has been discussed, and meanwhile plaster is falling on the children's heads in the old school and mice are gamboling with impunity. There were meetings, fundraising drives, and postulates, and councilmen tried to push forward this project and importune the authorities. But

there is still no new school; it could have been erected had not it been for the dilatoriness of the authorities; this is the common judgment in Stale Village. Jan Paz, twice councilman and now a candidate for another term, declared, "That accounts for this kind of attendance. And we do not expect that it will be any better during the elections. People value deeds, not words; they are fed up with promises and with being led by the nose. They are fed up with waiting and eyewash. They say that they are not going to show up and vote." Councilman Paz is critical; he gives the past term of office of the council a grade of D+. That plus is for installing the water supply system, and the 2 is for the whole of the council's activities. "Even if we elect councilmen of gold," he says, "people won't believe in our promises, since little has been done so far. People ask, why vote for these guys since they are not doing anything? No one believes us, and they will not believe anyone. How can we make the elections attractive considering that to this day the school still has not been built? Such is the bitter truth," Councilman Paz sums up. "We are on the downgrade and sinking in a quagmire."

For this reason, Jan Paz did not want to be a candidate. But he was persuaded by the argument that a man gets toughened by struggle. So he agreed. But truth to say, he is fed up with struggle and toughening. What then should be done? Let everything go to pieces? That also is out and wrong. But the situation at present is such that

Councilman Paz Feels Despair

Once this meeting room could not accommodate all those who came, but now it is peopled only by a handful, by those who had to come.

Stanislaw Rak, a retired teacher, chairman of the Educational Commission under the Voivodship People's Council, and a candidate for councilman, declared that as early as in 1977 he had established a committee for building the school and believed that the school would be built. He still believes it.

When asked whether the village community would participate in the elections or boycott them, S. Rak reasoned as follows: money is what keeps any office going, and if there is little money, the office cannot accomplish much. The other countries merely look on at what is happening here. In Gierek's time there was 99.9-percent voter attendance, whereas now it is 30-50 percent. Therefore, foreign opinion is that the authorities lack support and it wonders whether they can be partners in talks considering that voter attendance in this country is 30 percent. S. Rak further argued that we on our part should view these elections from the patriotic standpoint, because those foreign radio broadcasts are a pain in the neck.

Antoni Kowalski, a teacher, said that he was going to lose and knew it. He had agreed to be nominated because of the pressure exerted by the Executive Board, but his ties to the community are scanty—he has been director of the

high school in Grebow for only 2 months and he is a resident of Tarnobrzeg. Such a councilman would be of little use, but somebody's name had to be placed on the slate.

An incumbent councilman, Kolodziejczyk, who is a candidate for the next term of office, said that he does not understand the society. First it demands more democracy and then, after it gets it, it does not become involved in issues, talks furtively, and does not attend meetings. "The society is weary of discussions," the councilman admitted, and he asked why were not these elections made coincident with the referendum? He also wondered about the powers of councilmen: will they really come true, all of them, or will the bureaucracy triumph yet again? The public is not interested in the candidates.

Next, several villagers suddenly criticized the village chief and the gmina chief about 100 meters of a road which was not surfaced whereas the roads leading to the chief's relatives are smooth like a tabletop. As for those 100 meters, they are so pockmarked with potholes as to be not passable to cars.

The gmina chief, stung by this lack of gratitude on the gmina's part, answered, "Be glad that my roots are here, in Stale, because otherwise you would have gotten nothing. Fellas, heated speeches won't help you any. Instead, get busy."

Whereupon he left for still another, third, meeting with candidates on that day. Even so, he showed up late there. And as for Stale Village, its problems remained, problems that are truly depressing. It adjoins the sulfur extraction areas of the Jeziorko Mine and has the worst of everything: an air contaminated with sulfur compounds and uncertainty about the future. People are living out of suitcases, as nobody can tell whether the extraction will be extended to the village so that its inhabitants would have to pack and move out. Big industry has its plans and people their concerns: be or not to be, build or not build, act or not act. So far there are no compensations to them for this life of uncertainty; the village lacks amenities, culture, and entertainment. Its inhabitants complain of being condemned to vegetate. The infrastructure is neglected and everything is rotting or falling apart. Big industry is pressing on; it has no time to be concerned with the fate of individuals. The authorities too are indifferent to it. And the councilmen are impotent.

One month remains until the elections.

But the most difficult tasks still face the electoral collegiums. Following the public consultation and on its basis, they have to determine the electoral slates for all the districts. They will do so upon considering the opinions, comments, and recommendations of the voters.

Krol on Conservatives' Role in Politics, Present Needs

26000510 Warsaw ITD in Polish
No 22, 29 May 88 pp 14-15

[Interview with Marcin Krol, historian and editor, RES PUBLICA, by Marcin Urbanek]

[Text]

[Question] You dedicated your academic interests, concluded years ago with your assistant professorship dissertation, to Polish 19th Century conservative thought. Why that choice?

[Answer] Out of contrariness mainly. In Poland at that time people were engaged almost exclusively in leftist thought, overlooking or writing very unfavorably about rightist or conservative thought in its most diverse forms. If only for that reason, I felt it was worth dealing with.

[Question] Contrariness was the only reason?

[Answer] Not the only one, of course. In my education I never experienced something one might call a period of romance with Marxism or any version of socialism and conservative thought simply interested me more. Besides, I felt—and this proved to be true—that there were many things in it that were worth remembering.

[Question] But conservatives are not the best ideological model. Because this is also social minimalism and—more important—conciliation toward invaders. Was this not repulsive?

[Answer] I have never felt that this was a model that should be promulgated today. Especially since Polish conservative thought actually died out in the interwar period, even before the changes after 1945. But there were things in that thought that were taught only by conservatives in Poland. The first was respect for one's own tradition, the second a school of policy. Policy, not cultivating revolution, because where revolution begins, policy ends. There are lessons from the conservatives that have already been proven, i.e., that evolution is always better than revolution, that revolution destroys more than it creates in light of which it should be avoided at all costs, even though it is believed to be necessary. The conservatives taught parliamentary rule, compromise, balance of powers, those elements of the political game that—outside of them—did not exist in intellectual circulation in Poland. For many years something dominated that I would call—although I do not like the word—a romantic contempt for politics as an autonomous and self-important sphere in which one had to demean oneself. In the Polish political consciousness, "compromise" is a disgraceful concept, yet it is one of the principles of life and nowhere in the world besides

Poland is this refuted. The conservatives taught that negotiating compromises was worthwhile but only when one knows very well what one wants—because then one does not risk the loss of one's identity. And one more, very important doctrine. The conservatives, in contrast to many other directions, were always extremely open to the diversity of the social world, respecting the right of various groups and various minorities, not only national ones, to life and existence (as long as they did not violate certain generally accepted rules). They believed that the richness and diversity of social life were values of that life, not defects. Simplification, centralization, all forms of making social life more uniform, although they may seem better for administrative and organizational reasons, actually destroy the fabric of social life, and therefore do not serve that life at all.

[Question] They might have been the best teachers but did anyone want to listen to this lesson since the instructor himself volutarily gave up the struggle for independence?

[Answer] The conservatives never repudiated independence; that is an unwarranted belief manufactured by the party press in the interwar period and repeated by propaganda after the war. Of course, there were exceptions such as Henry Rzewuski, although he was actually not a true conservative but a renegade. In the famous declaration of the Krakow conservatives in 1866, "Before you we stand and desire to stand, Your Majesty," it is stated very clearly that this is as long as such circumstances exist.

[Question] And yet there was acquiescence to annexation, incapacitation and the political endowment of Galician autonomy?

[Answer] One could just as well ask what motivates people who do not declare a desire to fight for absolute independence from political blocs. They simply feel that that goal is temporarily unattainable. Reasonable people do not necessarily have to declare that they also want independence and full democracy, but because of limitations stemming from the geopolitical situation, they try to do as much as can be done at a given moment. The conservatives assumed that hope for independence existed, but they had to take into consideration that Poland would still have to live in bondage for many years. And given this, since it could not be otherwise, they had to look for compromise solutions and, instead of getting lost in socialist utopias, save what they could for the needs of the future free state. The conservatives knew very well that certain things were impossible, but the question arises, did they make mistakes at some point? Of course they made a mistake at the moment World War I broke out, but every politician ultimately risks this.

[Question] Yet history refuted the compromising attitudes of the conservatives. You yourself wrote in one of your books: "But conservative thought could never boast

that expanding the range of freedoms was their work, that the proposal for conciliation produced any practical results. The initiative always came from the partitioners."

[Answer] But there is at least one thing the Krakow conservatives managed to do, which was completely impossible in the Russian annexed territory, for example. It was the formation of personnel trained to execute policy. Thanks to these people Poland was able to become a completely modern state. Eighty percent of office personnel in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were people from Galicia, educated by the conservatives on virtually one book, "Dzieje Polski w zarysie" ["An Outline of Polish History"] by Michal Bobrzynski. Educated to think like good citizens. It was a triumph, although not so much a political triumph as an educational one.

[Question] Yet, if it were not for a group of madmen who did not listen to the conservatives, no one would have been able to take advantage of their knowledge, education and competence, because there simply would have been no opportunity.

[Answer] But it is very easy to see how much Pilsudski, for example, benefited from the conservatives.

[Question] Go ahead.

[Answer] First of all it was the conservatives who—in a certain sense—made Pilsudski's existence possible during the time of his Galician activity. In Russia he could only conspire, while he could work rather openly in Galicia, which enjoyed significant autonomy. In Polish political thought before the conservatives, there was nothing like that which was so clearly obvious with Pilsudski. The capacity for calculation, tactical concessions, situations of danger and compromises, even unpopular ones. Pilsudski, like Dmowski, was a modern politician, a political player.

[Question] Polish conservative thought thereby actually depleted its role. Has anything from it remained in Polish political thought today, in today's reality?

[Answer] In a literal sense, no. I think the situation is so much different that imitating models, conservative and others—Pilsudski's, National Democratic or socialist—is pure nonsense. There are no analogies in the history of thought. There is only recurrence of certain situations where there is only a limited number of behaviors. Conciliation, revolution, protest and finally escape from public life. But conveying literal attitudes by using quotations serves no purpose; however, if we treat history not as knowledge but as a field for experiments, many benefits can be derived from it. In public life, one should avoid experiments carried out on the living body of the social organism, because that is too dangerous.

[Question] Still conservatives exist and are doing well in Poland.

[Answer] Actually, in the 19th century sense, they do not exist. If they are there, it is conservatism in the sense of preservation, based on holding to existing political structures. One can be a conservative Marxist or a dogmatist, as it is called in the language of official journalism.

[Question] In your current writing activity, do you draw on anything from that 19th century thinkers and politicians?

[Answer] Yes, although I am more interested in Western European thought than Polish, because ours exhausted its intellectual attraction at a certain moment. This was not extraordinary intellectual baggage so I worry when I hear that there are five or six works written about the Krakow conservatives of Adolf Bochenski. I am not sure it is worthwhile.

[Question] Do you see yourself as a conservative?

[Answer] I cannot categorize myself. There has been such great ideological transformation all over the world that using any kind of formulas is more confusing than illuminating. I do not know how to place myself or my writings in categories such as leftist or rightist. A few years ago, Leszek Kolakowski published an article, "How to be a socialist-liberal conservative." I wholly endorse this article. Certainly I am not a Marxist and certainly I am not a nationalist, but in the middle I can surely be everything.

[Question] In other words, a socialist-liberal conservative?

[Answer] Perhaps. Certain elements of socialism, like the right to an equal start or social justice cannot be rejected. We have all accepted them, other than perhaps total lunatics. Likewise, anyone who is rational cannot deny that we will be unable to operate without a free market.

[Question] One of your most celebrated recent publications was an article printed a year ago in TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY—"Short distance, long distance." I see much in common between conservative thought and your article. You call for accepting a certain status quo as permanent for a some time, for compromising rather than struggling. Like the conservatives.

[Answer] No doubt there are some similarities; that is a matter of opinion. Perhaps someone else believes that there will be a change in the next six months, that the Yalta order will be subject to sudden disruption and colossal changes will take place. I do not expect such changes. Besides, my point is that in social and political life we should begin to think not in terms of resolving a current conflict but for the long term. I accuse both the government and the opposition of seeking only temporary success—for three or four months, a year at best. We should begin to think in a long term perspective and agree that for at least 20 years this political system will be permanent, because only this will permit resolution of

current conflicts with some purpose, rather than continual blundering and losing our way. As long as we do not have this stability of attitudes, day-to-day conflicts will be resolved poorly or be open to random solutions.

[Question] This leads to the point where the opposition should accept the permanence of the government for the long term, and the government must accept that the opposition will also persist and probably not come over to its side? This is supposed to be the idea for Poland?

[Answer] It is a beginning, so that ideas in general can emerge. As long as it is believed that during some very brief period an opponent can be destroyed, there will be no long term political thinking. And this is vital to Poland.

[Question] Hence conciliation and compromise from the school of conservative thought?

[Answer] Compromise, yes, but under certain conditions that must be met, which is not at all easy right now.

[Question] What conditions?

[Answer] First of all, guaranteeing the durability of changes and a sense of security. Civil liberties, freedom of education, the right to property and finally freedom from the need to adapt to successive mutations in the system. All this should be guaranteed so that no future crisis could deprive the people of that sense of security. So these guarantees should be not only legal, but political too. This leads to democratization of the system, hence to such changes in it that permit establishment of stable rules of the game. A permanent framework should at least be established which will liberate our thinking from constant transience. But for this it is necessary to have the courage for long term thinking.

[Question] What concrete conditions and guarantees would you see as basic?

[Answer] The first and most important is guaranteeing grass roots freedom, as I would call it, to public initiative. For example, the government could allow itself to depoliticize elections at the lowest level, to withdraw the party's election apparatus. I think it could permit itself to do this without risking disruption of the bases of a system which—I agree—cannot be disrupted at this time. It turns out that for the time being this will not happen. Associations are another issue. Allowing truly free development of associations of all kinds, as long as their activity is in compliance with law, thus truly bringing to life the principle that everything that is not prohibited is permitted. This is supposedly occurring but when one looks at the months-long struggles of the Warsaw Economic Society, it turns out that it is not occurring completely. Likewise greater changes are ostensibly taking place in the economic sphere, yet we, carrying on economic activity in order to earn money at RES PUBLICA, can see that this is ostensible. Establishing an

innovative enterprise, according to the announcements, was supposed to take one day, yet it takes six months. A universal unblocking of public initiative is necessary and this requires political, not economic, decisions. And political decisions are made too slowly and too cautiously.

[Question] So I am familiar with your conditions. But what should the opposition offer in the compromise you suggested?

[Answer] The opposition is destined to react to government moves. It should be ready for dialogue through facts, to action for the common good. One example of this is the Warsaw Industrial Society and, in a certain sense, RES PUBLICA. But up to now these are the only two examples existing in concrete form. This is very little for the process of so-called reconstruction—as it is called in Poland—which has been going on for a year and a half.

[Question] So opposition but—to use Osmanczyk's term—civil opposition. What does this actually mean?

[Answer] Civil opposition is opposition that make light of the problems of the state and life in that state, that does not turn its back on the state, although at the same time it disagrees with a great many of the government's decisions.

[Question] Stefan Kisielewski once said, "I love the PRL [Polish Peoples' Republic]." Do you love the PRL?

[Answer] No, I do not love the PRL. I tolerate the PRL.

12776

Public Opinion Polls Show Criticism of Strike Activity

26000413c Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
21-22 May 88 p 3

[Brief News Report by (PAP): "What We Think About the Strikes"]

[Text] Recently, strikes became the subject of a current public opinion poll, the third to be conducted this month (May 1988), by the Public Opinion Study Center. The two previous polls (on May 2 and 5) were conducted among Warsaw residents; the latest poll (on May 9-10) was done with a representative sample of the entire population of Poland.

The polls indicate that the majority of the public are highly critical of strikes. In this respect, the opinions of Warsaw residents are quite similar to the results of the national poll.

In the national poll, 57 percent of respondents described strikes as inappropriate, while in the earlier probes (among Warsaw residents) 50 percent (May 2) and

62 percent (May 5) expressed a critical attitude toward strikes. The latest national poll showed only 22 percent believed that strikes are appropriate. In earlier polls, 34 and 25 percent, respectively, said that they had no opinion one way or the other.

A pronounced majority of the respondents were aware of the negative effects of strikes; in the national poll 65 percent indicated that strikes can lead to a decline in living standards, 9 percent were of the opposite view and 26 percent had no opinion. Here, too, the results were similar to those registered on May 5 among residents of the capital, where 66 percent of those questioned were negative on the effects of a strike, 14 percent were of the opposite view and the rest had no opinion.

The question of whether workers should be paid for the time they are on strike was answered in the negative by 53 percent of respondents and in the affirmative by 29 percent, while 18 percent did not respond. Among Warsaw residents, 63 percent were against paying wages for time on strike, 27 were for it and the rest abstained from an opinion.

The latest public opinion poll, this time conducted on a national scale, has thus confirmed that the majority of respondents are convinced of the negative effect of strikes.

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Wojna Interviewed on Anticrisis Pact

26000501a Warsaw OLBODZENIE in Polish
No 21, 21 May 88 p 2

[Interview with Deputy Ryszard Wojna, vice chairman of the PZPR Caucus of Sejm Deputies and member of the Consultative Council under the Chairman of State: "Will the Anticrisis Pact Be Reached?"]

[Text]

[Question] Mr Deputy, during the Sejm debate of the decree on special powers for the government to implement the reform you again raised the issue of the "anticrisis pact." Was that a conclusion that you had drawn from the 2 tumultuous weeks in late April and early May [worker strikes]?

[Answer] That idea had been placed on the agenda even earlier and I think it not unlikely that, were not for the divisions that manifested themselves within the opposition as regards attitude toward the recent strikes, it would have already begun to take on some preliminary material form. Nowadays, and precisely nowadays, I believe that this idea should be resurrected. This may sound paradoxical, but it seems to me that after what had happened in Nowa Hut and at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, the chances for concluding such a pact have increased.

[Question] What would be its specific purpose?

[Answer] At a minimum, excluding the economy from the domain of skirmishes; and at a maximum, focusing all Polish national energies on the country's economic rebirth.

[Question] Is this realistic?

[Answer] That depends on how responsible all parties feel for our common Polish fate. And since nothing is happening in the social vacuum, attempts to bring about such an agreement on the economy are bound to encounter tremendous obstacles. The interview with Bronislaw Geremek which appeared in the February issue of KONFRONTACJE, a periodical published by the PRON [Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth, a kind of popular front] was made quite long before it could be published. This is not surprising. This was an act of courage on the part of both one of the major spokesmen of the opposition and those who made it possible for Bronislaw Geremek to present without any interference from censors his point of view on the possibility of concluding an anticrisis pact.

In that issue of KONFRONTACJE a position on that interview was taken by Ludwik Krasucki. His answer was stern, but it did not slam the door on the continuation of dialogue. However, other assessments of that interview differed. For example, TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY [a Catholic periodical] and Daniel Passent in POLITYKA were unusually in accord in their view that this first exchange of opinions on the subject demonstrated that there exist no chances for finding a common denominator.

Since in that interview a reference was made to my comments in the Sejm on the need for a definite abandonment of the Stalinist model of socialism, the editor of KONFRONTACJE invited me in the following issue of that periodical to offer a rejoinder. In my interview with him I voiced the suggestion that the next step toward opening a dialogue on concluding the anticrisis pact would be for the representatives of the opposition to obtain information on the logic, objectives, and mechanisms of the economic reform at the source. At the source, meaning, from [Deputy Prime Minister] Professor Zdzislaw Sadowski.

The editors of KONFRONTACJE subsequently advised me that Bronislaw Geremek responded positively to that proposal. The idea of having that encounter take place in the Sejm was even considered. Subsequently I learned that interest in talking with the deputy prime minister about the economic reform was voiced also by other well-known activists who are politically close to Mr Geremek. Prof Sadowski expressed his readiness to cooperate, and this was soon followed by establishing contacts which led to fixing the date for such a meeting. This was mentioned at a certain moment by the Government Press Spokesman Minister Jerzy Urban. But by

then social tensions had risen and some people had moreover become emotionally intransigent, which did not contribute to objective and reasoned talks. That is why that meeting did not take place. Early in May the climate was not favorable. But nowadays, now that we all are pondering the conclusions to be inferred from the recent upsurge in the wave of strikes, I believe that the thread of dialogue commenced before the strikes should be taken up again. To be sure, it is a feeble thread, but it still points to the direction of the rethinking that is beginning to blaze a trail for itself here and there.

[Question] How do you conceive the specific circumstances under which that pact would be concluded? Would it be concluded in the Sejm's Hall of Pillars, where, in the glare of TV klieg lights, and in the presence of a smiling crowd and dark-suited politicians, officials, and economic activists, two representatives would solemnly sign a pact by virtue of which the opposition will cease to question what the government is "doing" about the economy?

[Answer] Ha ha, that is a good jest! I believe that no one would interpret the anticrisis pact as some negotiated document. The point rather is to establish contacts leading to a broader common denominator of national reconciliation for the sake of strategic problems of the economy. This is in the interest of all, of the entire society and its future.

Besides, I have been long representing this point of view. During the discussion of the planks of the PRON's program, that is, several years ago, I expressed in ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE the view that national reconciliation should be confined to several crucial points, such as the economy, the *raison d'etat*, the direction of the state's social policies, and environmental protection. Then it would be more realistic and effective. After all, we all don't have to agree on everything.

[Question] What would that begin with?

[Answer] I visualize it as follows: Professor Zdzislaw Sadowski together with his associates and several economists from various advisory bodies to the government and the Sejm—which also include persons who are politically not too distant from the opposition—would meet with, say, a dozen or so persons whose names are correspondingly authoritative among the opposition and expound to them the *philosophy* of the economic reform as well as the model of economic and social relations at which we are aiming. He himself terms that model the participatory society. And then the talks would begin. A prerequisite for their success would be that everyone should check at the cloakroom not only his overcoat but also propaganda, demagoguery, and mutual prejudices. Is that possible? I don't know. But I assume that persons who accept a great social responsibility should be capable of it. That would precisely be a proof of responsibility.

I doubt, though, that everyone would be satisfied with that initial meeting. The problems are very complex. Economic decisions also affect mechanisms of power. And, in politics, agreements are possible only on the principle of "do ut des" [give and take]. That is why in my Sejm speech with which we began this interview I had declared, "The effectiveness of talks on economic affairs with those who consider themselves the opposition would to many of us be the decisive argument in favor of broadening and deepening the process of democratization in Poland."

[Question] Are not you afraid that, when agreements are thus explored with people who are very critically disposed toward the party, the party may risk being accused by certain of its "hardliners" of losing its own identity?

[Answer] Nowadays dogmatically thinking activists no longer have a base of social support, whether within or without the party. Ever since the Ninth Congress, i.e., since 1981, the party placed the reforms in its vanguard. To be sure, at times my impression is that the party's leadership echelons are more in the vanguard than certain of its intermediate elements. That is why I view the following passage from the Politburo session of 10 May as criticizing these elements: [The Politburo] "deemed indispensable a more rapid and more dynamic application of the resolutions of the Sixth PZPR Central Committee Plenum intended to foster further democratic transformation, augment room for the growth of social initiative and activism, and promote national reconciliation more boldly." In my opinion, this statement also accommodates the idea of the anticrisis pact.

[Question] Is this the main conclusion that you draw from the recent strikes?

[Answer] Other conclusions, too, can be drawn and we should discuss them quite rapidly and thoroughly. For example, why was the strike situation at its worst precisely at two plants whose counterparts in the West are experiencing a most severe structural crisis, namely, shipyards and steel plants? Are the considerations involved broader than merely particular Polish ones? Or consider this question: why were the strikes this time most popular among young people who are only about to become the working class? What does ensue there from to us all? Both at Nowa Huta and at the Gdansk shipyard these young strikers were definitely a minority of the workforce. We also should, jointly with the opposition, consider the damage to the international contacts of the Polish economy. And, as known, unless there is influx of foreign capital and credit, the crisis situation will drag on.

Thus, these 2 tumultuous weeks provided plenty of food for thought. The conclusions must be inferred rapidly and followed up just as rapidly. Time is not in our favor.

The ship of the economic reform is barely beginning to enter the strait between Scylla and Charibdis, and is yet to navigate dozens of other extremely difficult and stormy straits.

[Question] Thank you for the interview.

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Social Pluralism, Anticrisis Pact Debate: Where to Now

26000594 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish
No 31, 30 Jul 88 pp 1, 13

[Article by Adam Krzeminski: "Indirect Dialogue" under the rubric "The Anticrisis Pact"]

[Text] In politics, as known, it is not always easy to distinguish between a verbally announced revolution and the commencement of genuine changes in the structure of countries and societies. Sometimes lofty formulas mask impotence, and sometimes changes take place in silence. But it also happens that new "keywords" unlock a new reality. For several months now the term "anticrisis pact" has been appearing in the Polish press and in the declarations of politicians; recently, however, this term has been replaced with "the proreform coalition." Is this a chimera which time shall dispel or is this proof of changes based on the trial and error method?

The father of the term "the anticrisis pact" is a KONFRONTACJE reporter who used it while interviewing an adviser of the former National Coordinating Commission of Solidarity, Bronislaw Geremek. That term would have been forgotten had not Geremek accepted and elaborated on it in that interview, claiming that psychologically we still exist in the martial law era, in an era of clash and conflict between the authorities and the society. "Entering into dialogue with the society requires acknowledging its right to self-organization—this will not be substituted by any sham institutions." As for the society, on its part it should act in the spirit of the agreements of 1980 and accept as the point of departure the existing legal order "together with the principle of the leading role of the PZPR, which implies a certain scope of the party's monopoly on power," for example, on foreign and defense policies, national security, and the representative system, and the closer the elections and parliamentary practice are "to democratic principles, the better for both the society and the authorities."

But as for the social agreements, according to Geremek, they are to apply to domains outside the monopoly of the authorities, "such as the operation of independent associations or clubs of political thought." This "anticrisis pact" should have greater chances for success in 1988 than 7 years ago, because the society has realized that it must keep its aspirations and strivings within reasonable bounds, while the authorities have realized that a turn-about in the economy cannot be achieved without the participation of authentic social forces.

A condition for the pact is to be pluralism ("I admit that I attach principal importance to trade-union pluralism") of a kind that should be no threat to the authorities: "On the contrary, that would be a factor promoting an authentic shared responsibility of the society in a broad anticrisis pact.... The institutionalization of social pluralism may acquire various forms, such as, e.g., a second chamber of the Sejm where various social interests could be articulated, or extraparlimentary representative bodies. This concerns narrowing the reach of the state and augmenting the domain of civic freedom."

That interview was not the only signal. Toward the end of July PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI published a letter by 30 intellectuals, including the Rector of Warsaw University Professor Grzegorz Bialkowski, the economic adviser of the former Solidarity Ryszard Bugaj, the Russicist Andrzej Drawicz, the former POLITYKA publicist and cofounder of the Warsaw Industrial Society Aleksander Paszynski, the Chairman of the former Writers' Union Jan Jozef Szczepanski, the chairman of the former board of the Polish PEN Club Juliusz Zulawski, and others. They appealed to the rulers for "a change in anachronistic laws on associations, dating from half a century ago, and for legislation that would make the courts oversee the related decisions," as well as for "consent to the creation of genuine conditions (periodicals, clubs, etc.) for an unhampered discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the state's socioeconomic system. We appeal for acknowledging that no one has a patent for infallibility, and that those who think differently from the authorities have the same right as they to expound their rationales to the society." And the conclusion: "Poland needs a GENUINE SOCIAL CONSENSUS based not only on the forces accepting the present system but also on those who perceive the need for far-reaching reforms of that system in the direction of affirming the identity of the society in all ways."

That letter caused no great resonance, perhaps because the interview with Bronislaw Geremek in KONFRONTACJE had already broken a taboo in that an official periodical had published comments by a leading Solidarity adviser, a person who had not so long ago used to be publicly attacked.

A rejoinder to the interview with Geremek was provided by Deputy Editor in Chief of NOWE DROGI Ludwik Krasucki in the same February issue of KONFRONTACJE. "We shall not accept as good coin the condescending allocation of domains of exclusivity to the party and the authorities.... For since in some domains we are to be 'given' exclusivity, this means that others are indirectly desired by them [the opposition].... The elimination of the party shall not come into question." The party ideologue in his rejoinder interpreted pluralism "as a genuine agreement among autonomous and constructive and responsible sides not as a field for insane quarrels and undermining activities." Likewise, he condemned the authorities-versus-the-society notion as "an unrealistic rhetorical figure veiling an oversimplification

or a negative political concept." The society is divided otherwise, Krasucki summed up. It includes "a zone oriented toward repetition of anarchy, as well as a zone of conservatism, which in the Polish case is not so much of dogmatic as of bureaucratic provenance. It also includes a zone of extensive apprehensions of the painful consequences of the economic reform and of consistent decentralization and the abolition of ubiquitous paternalism which distributes a little to everyone but in return demands little of everyone. Then also there is a zone of apathy, influenced not so much by 'learned passivity' as by the pressures of material and other vexations of quotidian life. A separate analysis would be needed to explain why such different domains are united by a primitive populism, proneness toward unrealistic demands."

This rebuttal was interpreted by the opposition as closing the door. That was how TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY had interpreted it last March ("Any reasoned anticrisis contract or pact between partners whose positions are so far apart is simply impossible").

However, once expressed, the idea of the "anticrisis pact" did not disappear without a trace, the more so because the representatives of the political Establishment seized on it. The term "anticrisis pact" was used by Jozef Czyrek in an interview granted to TRYBUNA LUDU, while Ryszard Wojna wrote in RZECZPOSPOLITA: "The need for an Anticrisis Pact simply ensues from the society's instinct for self-preservation. Will a dialogue on this topic arise, but one aimed at the necessity of a national consensus?" And in the following (March) issue of KONFRONTACJE Wojna plainly declared, "The awareness of the anticrisis pact referred to by Bronislaw Geremek is by now quite widespread 'at the top' on all sides of the former dividing lines."

Wojna, a member of the Consultative Council under the Head of State General Jaruzelski and Chairman of the Sejm Commission for Foreign Affairs, went much farther than the deputy editor in chief of NOWE DROGI: "We are in the period of transition from socialism of the Stalinist type to an extensively corrected system of society desiring to preserve the basic values and sense of socialism and at the same time to restructure the principles and mechanisms of economic life in the spirit demanded by the laws of the market." But Wojna also is opposed to sharing of power: "That would conflict with the experience of history known to us. The reform can be carried out only by the actually existing state and its constitutional bodies, and primarily by the government. The opposition wants to share in shaping this process, but for this very reason it should affirm and support the points of contact formulated expressis verbis or by way of onesided declarations in an unwritten but adhered to anticrisis pact."

The discussion of the "pact" began at a time when the reformers among the authorities could demonstrate several explicit accomplishments in democratizing the system

of society. In the recent period this meant the establishment of:

- The Consultative Council under the Chairman of the Council of State;
- The Constitutional Tribunal;
- The Citizens' Rights Spokesman;
- The conduct of the referendum.

On the other hand, the market situation was not markedly improved and a substantial part of the opposition, beginning with Lech Walesa and part of the leadership of the former Solidarity, was not won over to legal cooperation. The refusal of several prominent representatives of the Catholic circles to participate in the Consultative Council pointed to the existing obstacles, although the presence in that Council of such eminent political figures as attorney Wladyslaw Sila-Nowicki or Professor Andrzej Tymowski indicates that the Council may be a broad representation of political constituencies.

Likewise, the state of public opinion is not completely normal. Part of oppositionist opinions is expressed in underground periodicals, of which some, such as KRYTYKA or KULTURA NIEZALEZNA, appear to have a regular readership. On the other hand, diversifying the official publishing market with such periodicals as RES PUBLICA, ODRODZENIE, and KONFRONTACJE is broadening the traditional alignments.

Thus, in the April issue of another new periodical, REPORTER, Professor Marian Gulczynski gives an interview criticizing the authorities for "mirroring a kind of compromise between the old and new alignments of forces. After all, it is not only narrow segments of the leadership that support preserving old priorities in the economy. Entire segments of the Polish society also are linked to it." Gulczynski envisages two scenarios: either an explosion or a turnabout in the structures of the authorities. "On the Polish 'chessboard' we shall make a forward move only when supporters of a complete reform of both methods of management and the subsector structure of the economy will be given the floor."

Late in April and early in May both scenarios took place, in the sense of a limited explosion of strikes in Nowa Huta, Stalowa Wola, Gdansk, and Bydgoszcz, as well as some "forward movement" in the structures of the authorities. The Seventh Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee may be interpreted as presaging radical reforms. However, the scheduled elections to people's councils were conducted in accordance with electoral laws that had been, to be sure, revised but far from sufficiently. The result: low voter turnout despite the possibilities of making a choice between Kwiatkowski and Kowalski [between John Doe and John Smith], between male and female, between old and young, candidates. That was not yet a model of elections to representative bodies that could reconcile the internally quarreling or at any rate deeply divided society. Despite the revisions of the Decree on People's Councils so as to

empower the councils to handle their own financial affairs and even to elect the voivodship governor, it will be difficult nowadays for the newly elected councils to win the confidence of the populace, even though comments by Ryszard Kardasz, an activist who considers himself an oppositionist from the Solidarity circle, but who risked testing personally how well the new electoral laws work and became a councilman in Tarnobrzeg, as published in the previous issue of POLITYKA (No 30), indicate that here too things are starting to move.

The Dispute Over the Red Cap

But the movement is not that obvious. As late as in the end of May TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY published a sharp polemic by Ryszard Bugaj against the column by Daniel Passent who stated, "A compromise with the independent circles is pointless, because, while to be sure they propose (through the mouth of Bronislaw Geremek) acknowledging the leading role of the party and the constitutional principles of the system of society," essentially "that leading role is to be reduced to wearing a red cap." Bugaj's rebuttal: "Unlike Daniel Passent, I believe that the policy of bold modernization of the system, though not devoid of risk, in the long run affords greater opportunities to the authorities as well. Greater opportunities for restraining dissent." The Solidarity adviser further comments in TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY that there exist factors conducive to changes: "There is no way of specifying unambiguously what scope of modernization of the system is needed to unlock prospects for a substantial improvement in economic effectiveness and the rise in a new social stability. Despite all the differences in views, however, an option that could be termed THE MARKET and SOCIAL PLURALISM appears to be gaining in importance. These terms are, of course, slogans which may be quite differently interpreted." The slogan of pluralism reflects "the intentions to explore and identify a corpus of changes which can be reconciled with the 'principle of the party's leading role,' but of course when that principle is narrowly interpreted. It is generally assumed that social pluralism must safeguard the existence of trade unions, associations, local administration (even if only at the gmina level), and public opinion outside the control of the party and educational authorities. On the other hand, it also is assumed that social pluralism (unlike political pluralism par excellence) lacks that party pluralism which is crucial to any democratic society." In this way Bugaj attempted to define more precisely the "Dispute Over the Red Cap," pointing to the need for a new understanding of the party's leading role.

In an atmosphere of a compromise between old and new forces, thoughts long not heard and to many people hardly conceivable began to be voiced in the last few months. Thus, Adam Schaff, in an interview granted to the Krakow ZDANIE, was the first to propose establishing in Poland a Christian Democratic party that would accept the role of the legal opposition. In his turn, the aforementioned Ryszard Kardasz has been testing in

practice the new powers of councilmen and declared in POLITYKA that he is thinking of forming a debating club "which perhaps could develop into a political party as patterned chiefly on the 'Greens.' An independent party is needed by those who have no confidence in the PRON [Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth]."

All these signals are meeting with encouragement from several weighty comments made by Gen Jaruzelski in mid-June at the Seventh PZPR Central Committee Plenum. In his report to that Plenum he provided several new accents:

—On freedom of association: "It also is the party's intention that the new possibilities for self-association should not promote transferring to appropriate social organizations certain functions traditionally exercised by the apparatus of state."

—On establishing the Senate: "The idea of establishing the Second Chamber of the Sejm is being discussed within the PZPR, among its coalition partners, and in many constituencies. This is a major element of the conceptual work on the new Constitution of the Polish People's Republic that has already been initiated in accordance with the decision of the 10th Congress. We also propose that the socioeconomic councils under the voivodship people's councils develop into an institutional form of integrating various forms of self-government."

—On the coalition: "The broadening of traditional and opening of new roads toward the broad, patriotic, and proreform coalition indispensable to Poland is not a temporary tactic but a permanent element of our program. This program offers room for major experiments. Contrary to various apprehensions and warnings, the formation of the Consultative Council, as well as of citizens' conventions in certain voivodships, is producing positive results."

—On Christian representation: "For we consider that situation to be normal and beneficial when the people's state cannot be identified with militant atheism and the church with political clericalism.... Differences in world outlook and disputes over it can and should be a creative rather than obstructive element of cooperation on issues that matter most to the nation. This is linked to the possibility of attaining a higher level of political representation by the organizational groupings that are rooted in the social teachings of the church and constructively disposed toward the socialist state."

These utterances engendered speculation as to whether a united Christian Democratic Party can indeed be formed in this country. It would hard to conceive of a merger of the groupings represented in the Sejm, such as the ChSS [Christian Social Association], the "Pax," the PZKS, etc., with the Catholic groups supporting the KIK [Club of the Catholic Intelligentsia] or the "Znak" into a

single Christian-Democratic Opposition of His Royal Majesty [i.e., British-style "royal opposition"], as was declared in ODRODZENIE. At present this appears neither possible nor desirable owing to practical and ideological considerations as well as owing to the personalities of the leaders of these groupings. It is hardly likely either that they would unite with those activists of former Solidarity who are associated with the church. Hence, on the one hand, augmenting the Christian representation in the Sejm by several score seats is being discussed, and on the other, mention is made of the rise of a grassroots movement based on associations and political clubs from which in time may emerge new political personalities and new groupings which may some day develop into a Christian-Democratic Party. But that is a program which would take years, not months.

The Attempt at Elections

An indirect reply to this signal and at the same time a continuation of the debate was provided by the article by Ryszard Bugaj and Andrzej Wielowieyski in TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY which, though censored, to be sure, on the one hand offered criticism of the procrastination and sham measures of the authorities and on the other was a challenge to the independent groupings "to avert the failure of the changes being introduced at present. Despite all the risk associated with supporting changes that are currently advocated by the authorities, we perceive no other alternative that would be more favorable to national interests. We wish to emphasize our belief that failure of the current attempts at reform is bound to result in a prolonged impasse with hardly foreseeable negative consequences. Of major importance could be some kind of cooperation between the government forces and the independent groupings." Thereupon the authors enumerate 10 points for such cooperation: combining economic reforms with democratization of the political system, inclusive of trade-union pluralism [legalization of Solidarity], freedom of association, and abolition of censorship. Next, introduction of market mechanisms and curtailment of government intervention, commercialization of the banking system, and measures to counteract monopolies. Further, guarantees of equality of the state, social, and private sectors..., and so on, ending with a change in the priorities of investment policy, the development of a realistic program for repaying foreign indebtedness, etc.

They conclude: "The principle of self-restraint has to be accepted. With regard to the society and the independent groupings, self-restraint must mean restraint in making political and material demands. With regard to the authorities, it must above all mean relinquishing the present scope of the exercise of power." Not only the FORM but the SCOPE.

In a series of two articles in RZECZPOSPOLITA Ryszard Wojna provides an extremely bitter account of his party. Nowadays it is not seemly, Wojna writes, to rule by claiming a self-annointed historical right or on behalf

of the sole right ideology. "Who would accept such an unequal alliance in which one of the parties, claiming a self-anointed right, proclaims its monopoly on how to define socialism, and hence also the leading role?" Nowadays voters have to be courted and parliamentarianism is the proper form of people's rule. "True, it used to be not so long ago that purists commanded despising any courting of voters, viewing this as readiness to switch to parliamentary democracy, which at some periods of time Stalinist socialism practically identified with betrayal of proletarian ideals."

Wojna characterizes the June elections as follows: "The low voter turnout in the recent elections to people's councils, and especially in some worker communities, also raises a question as to the extent to which the PZPR has adapted itself to the contemporary structures of our society, and especially to the changes that have taken place within the working class." He concludes that during the first 40 years of existence of People's Poland party programs resulted in the construction of a dozen or so mighty worker fortresses that were supposed to be the pillars of the new social order but in reality became the principal source of problems to the party. On the one hand, because the heavy industry built in postwar Poland is at present affected by the worldwide crisis of modernization and "the third technological revolution," which is based on electronics rather than on coal and steel. On the other hand, because the party apparatus was unaware of the changes taking place: it used to "play the role of the vanguard of the party, which in its turn was to be the vanguard of the working class and hence also of the entire nation." Nowadays, however, this apparatus still has not freed itself conclusively of the Stalinist model, and it has not either been able to alter its doctrinal attitude toward private property, adapt itself to that educational revolution which it itself had initiated, or accept many national traditions and Christian roots of Polish culture. All this taken together has resulted in its substantive alienation. "Every system of society harbors within itself its own contradiction which disintegrates its mechanisms. In 19th-century capitalism such a contradiction was the growth of the working class. The contradiction of socialism of the Stalinist type was the opening of access to science and education. Highly educated segments of the society strive toward genuine participation in power instead of contenting themselves with consultative democracy (a term I am borrowing from Professor Stelmachowski)."

Criticism of the Authorities

Ryszard Wojna's criticism of the conservatism and procrastination of the apparatus of power is duplicated by others. In an interview granted to ZYCIE WARSZAWY 2 weeks ago Mariusz Gulczynski attacked the "aktivocracy": "The anger of the young is nowadays chiefly directed against local alignments and plant aktivocracy which tenaciously defends its privileges. We know of instances in which a sign of equality was placed between

defending socialism and defending whatever Administration happened to be in power. The threat of aktivocracy exists at every level." According to Gulczynski, the June elections would have been a success "had the new solutions demanded by public opinion been introduced; had persons outside the local aktivocracy been members of the electoral commissions, and had petitions containing just 100 or 200 signatures been considered an acceptable way of nominating candidates, etc." Next year's elections to the Sejm should reflect more closely the actual alignment of political forces: "There exist informal organized forces which in the long run may turn into illegal forces. But when they organize themselves illegally, they usually become destructive, whereas an overwhelming majority of these forces could have been constructively oppositionist. That is why I consider the right of free association to be a crucial issue. This also applies to political associations and clubs. "Dziekania" or Clubs of Catholic Intelligentsia exemplify such debating clubs of a political nature which should exist in larger numbers."

At the same time, the editor in chief of the independent periodical RES PUBLICA Marcin Krol, when asked by a French radio journalist what he thinks of a political agreement between the independent groupings and the authorities, answered, "I think that the platform for agreement is an exaggeration. What we are doing we term privately indirect dialogue. Besides, I don't perceive any platform for agreement. Mentions of the anticrisis pact or suchlike things seem somewhat abstract to me. No specific proposal that can be accepted or rejected has been made yet...." And when asked whether he would accept a seat in the Sejm if the opposition, as is being mentioned, were to receive 60 seats, Marcin Krol answered, "What does it mean, 'as is being mentioned'? If we receive such a proposition officially from the authorities, we shall consider it. For the time being there is nothing to talk about."

And so, over half a year, a certain manner of thinking has spread and come full circle. Ideas which had been opposed last February are now in daily circulation among the authorities. And the meetings of leading activists such as Jozef Czyrek [foreign minister] with independent intellectuals in Krakow or Stanislaw Ciosek [Central Committee secretary] with the "Consensus" group in Warsaw prove that the method of dialogue, of trial and error, can serve to accomplish substantive changes in the system of society, to broaden the circles of people who not only speak of national consensus but also act to translate it into reality.

To the extent that a certain manner of thinking and talking has been accepted in recent months, the use of a term has been disappearing. It is not only Marcin Krol that reacts adversely to the term "the anticrisis pact." Jozef Czyrek in his interview granted to TRYBUNA LUDU and Jerzy Urban at a press conference both referred to the "proreform coalition" instead of the "anticrisis pact." It is hard to say whether this is a mere

substitution of terms in order to avoid that bugbear of the crisis, the desire to avoid some new "pacta conventa" which in the pre-Partitions Poland tied the hands of the king who had signed them [by giving away too many rights to the nobility]. At any rate, we exist at a moment of the reform when it is necessary to alter the substance rather than the outward form.

Despite attempts to gloss this over, Central-Eastern Europe has been existing in a transition period, and that not since the last 2 years but since 1956 [worker protests in Poznan], with all of its shocks and crises. Now, however, we are personally witnessing the irrevocable death of Stalinist communism. The revelations of Stalinist crimes are not mere moral-cosmetic exercise; they also undermine the entire network of the institutions and dogmas justifying them. At the same time, the disintegration of Stalinism requires new answers to all the fundamental questions about socialism, and in every country, regardless of tradition, these answers may differ. For while, by the nature of things, in the USSR logic necessitates harkening back to Lenin's utterances, in Poland it would be necessary to harken back to the traditions and ideological values of Polish socialism, and especially to the neglected traditions of the PSS [former Polish Socialist Party]. In the end, although the ruling party in our country calls itself "United" [that is, it is the result of a merger between the PPS and the Polish CP], the PPS traditions were discarded almost completely in the 1950s. Ryszard Wojna's article in *RZECZPOSPOLITA*, which discusses the evolution of the Socialists in France and Social Democrats in the German Federal Republic, indicates, although employing somewhat distant examples, that the parties which retain and consolidate their standing in society are the ones which successfully adapt their political philosophy to new conditions and search for living roots confirming the choice in favor of democracy. There is no reason to conceal the fact that in this country, too, such is the trend of the reforms leading to authentic pluralism and the grassroots crystallization of new political structures. Active pluralism is also bound to influence changes within the party in favor of greater openness, a change in the style of politicking, and search for new intellectual attractiveness.

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Positive Aspects of Pluralism Enumerated
26000504a Warsaw *ODRODZENIE* in Polish
No 22, 28 May 88 p 1

[Article by Tomasz Bartoszewicz: "Pluralism Under Socialism"]

[Text] Pluralism has recently become a very fashionable topic in this country. As late as several years ago it was officially considered in the pejorative category. Only Prof S. Ehrlich tried to argue that the devil is not as bad

as he is painted. Nowadays everyone is a pluralist. "Socialist pluralism" is discussed in party documents. But not everyone interprets this concept in the same way.

There is no doubt that without the development of socialist democracy the reform program would be incomplete, to say the least, and might not even be feasible. As indicated even by the figures provided by a government agency, the CBOS [Public Opinion Survey Center], the society's trust in the authorities, and especially in the government, is low and, what is more, diminishing. The average citizen, as before, does not identify himself with the state, despite the persistent activities of pro-state publicists led by K. Kozniewski.

This may be happening because the so-called man in the street still feels, apparently not without reason, that he has no influence on events in this country. In this respect the price-increase referendum can certainly be viewed positively, because, owing to it, for the first time in 40 years the act of voting was combined with act of choice.

An Ordering of Concepts

I must admit that to me personally the term "socialist pluralism" sounds hardly appropriate. For it presupposes, as it were, different roads toward the common goal, namely, the socialist society. I certainly do not mean to question the differentness of these roads or the goal itself, and anyway that is not the point I am going to make.

In this connection, I propose that the term "socialist pluralism" be replaced with "pluralism under socialism." This is not a question of a mere semantic operation but of an ordering of concepts. For these concepts are not tantamount.

Pluralism under socialism should presuppose, in my opinion, freedom of action by all political forces which do not oppose broadly understood constitutional order in the Polish People's Republic. By the same token, this concept contains two elements: first, the abolition of the monopoly of the traditional political groupings over public activity; and second, the allegiance of all the new political forces to the constitutional principles.

And here we arrive at the heart of the matter. Any eventual new political forces need not at all be groupings of a "socialist" nature, so long as they are not of an "antisocialist" nature, that is, it is not their aim to change the system of society.

A Broad Field of Maneuver

A thus formulated "pluralism under socialism" would offer a sufficiently broad field of action for groupings not yet present on the official political map of Poland. For it presupposes the right to act legally for all those who do

not feel accommodated by the currently existing parties and associations but who still are ready to make constructive contributions to this country's welfare.

Recently several comments implying the possibility of forming new political groupings have been made in the mass media. I believe that the issue deserves discussion. In particular, it is worth considering the expediency of forming such groupings within the constituencies that guide themselves by the social doctrine of the Catholic Church and circles which may be conditionally termed the "non-Marxist left."

Currently these constituencies have limited possibilities for promoting their own political identity, even when they publish their own periodicals as in the case of the Catholics guiding themselves by the social doctrine of the church and linked to the Episcopate.

Facilitating legal public activity for these constituencies would of a certainty not imperil the system of society, contrary to the assertions of certain exponents of conservative tendencies.

Whatever Is Not Forbidden

In forming new political groupings the most proper solution would be, in my opinion the adoption of the famous statement of Prime Minister Z. Messner, "Whatever is not forbidden, is permitted," which in this case could be changed to "Whatever is not antisocialist is permissible."

Such a formula would precisely embody the principle of "pluralism under socialism." For it would preclude possibility of action only for those groupings whose aim is to overthrow the system of society.

I am aware of the controversial nature of this postulate, which transcends considerably the framework of our present political reality. Among the authorities there is no shortage of persons fearing that any widening of political freedoms in this country could result in occurrences undesirable from their point of view.

Above all, under the present circumstances, at least seemingly, it is easier to rule. Channels of communication with coalition partners, whose identity is commonly known, have already been opened in a commonly known manner. But that is only a seeming ease, if only in view of the cyclical recurrence of sociopolitical crises. It is simply that a substantial segment of the society does not identify itself, for various reasons, with the currently existing organizations, which causes the process of reconciliation to be incomplete, to say the least.

Second, the view that any "relaxation" is bound to result in an offensive by the antisocialist forces is quite often encountered. This is another great oversimplification. While I do not deny the existence of forces of that kind, I personally think that their influence is overestimated,

and besides persons who, given the legality of their action, are accommodated within the framework of the "opposition within the system" sometimes also are included among these forces. Consider for example the RES PUBLICA [a newspaper proclaiming itself independent, yet legally published] group.

Third, and last, it would be in the well-understood interest of the authorities to bring about a situation in which the opposition—except of course the antisocialist opposition—would operate by strictly legal methods, since this imposes certain self-constraints: anybody who joins in a particular game is expected by the same token to follow the rules of that game.

Safeguards

Given the apprehensions of a substantial part of the apparatus of the authorities, it is certainly necessary to consider what safeguards would assure retaining control of the situation in this country in the presence of greater pluralism. Such safeguards should be sufficiently strong to satisfy those who fear the consequences of such far-reaching democracy, and at the same time they should be sufficiently flexible so as not to discourage potential participants in the political game.

One such safeguard could be establishing the Office of the President of the Polish People's Republic (PRL), an office endowed with major prerogatives. Thus, for example, the President would have sole say on problems of national defense, national security, and foreign policy. Powers of this kind are specified in, for example, the constitution of Finland, and in that country they passed their test, assuring the maintenance of a policy of friendship with the USSR irrespective of the alignment of the Finnish political forces.

The establishment of the Office of PRL President could be linked to an envisioned constitutional amendment. In this connection, securing for the party the sole right to nominate candidates for that office could be a way of reflecting the constitutionally guaranteed leading role of the PZPR.

It appears that a major broadening of political pluralism in this country is feasible without impairing the principles of our system of society.

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Party Activities Calendar 9-22 May 1988
26000490b Warsaw ZYCIE PARTII in Polish
No 11, 1 Jun 88 p 21

[Text]

Meetings of the Central Committee Politburo

10 May—The Politburo discussed the sociopolitical and economic situation in the country and familiarized itself with the course of the implementation of state and

economic reforms; it acquainted itself with the results of the discussion on the draft plans of a law on extraordinary powers for the government intended to serve the protection of the standard of living of working people and the more complete application of the second stage of the economic reform; the Politburo familiarized itself with information on the course of the implementation of the agreements of the Polish-Soviet declaration on cooperation in the area of ideology, science and culture, and with the assessment of the implementation of a complex program of strengthening and developing PRL-USSR relations.

17 May—The Politburo familiarized itself with government information on the decisions and activities under preparation related to the implementation of the Sejm act on extraordinary powers for the Council of Ministers; it examined the preliminary proposals of changes and supplements to the National Socioeconomic Plan [NPSG] for 1986-1990; it acquainted itself with the draft plans of changes in the functioning and improvement of organizational structures of the cooperative movement; it discussed the motions from meetings of the PZPR Deputies Club and the Circle of Deputies With No Party Affiliation with the representatives of the party leadership; it approvingly accepted information on the talks conducted in Krakow and Gdansk by Czeslaw Kiszczak, chairman of the Council of Ministers Committee for Observing the Law, Public Order and Social Discipline.

Meeting of the Central Commission for PZPR, ZSL, and SD Cooperation

9 May—A meeting was held of the Central Commission for PZPR, ZSL, and SD Cooperation. The following participated in the meeting from the PZPR: Wojciech Jaruzelski, Jozef Czyrek, Tadeusz Porebski, Marian Wozniak, and Kazimierz Cypryński.

An assessment was carried out of the current sociopolitical situation in the country. The commission spoke on behalf of introducing extraordinary powers and rights for the Council of Ministers that would accelerate the processes of reforming our economy.

Conferences and Meetings

12 May—Politburo member Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski discussed with PZPR Central Committee lecturers the sociopolitical and economic situation in the country and the conclusions arising from it. The meeting was led by Andrzej Czyz, director of the Central Committee Ideological Department.

13 May—Politburo deputy member and Central Committee secretary, Zbigniew Michalek, participated in the meeting of the party, self-government, and union aktiv as well as in the meeting of the managerial cadre of the PGR industrial group in Glubczyce. The possibilities of the further intensification of production and improvement in the living and working conditions of the work force were discussed.

14 May—Politburo member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Baryla received Hans Sattler, minister-director of the Office for GDR Youth, during his visit to Poland. The following took part in the meeting: Director of the Central Committee Political-Organizational Department, Stanislaw Gabrielski, as well as A. Kwasniewski, chairman of the Youth and Physical Education Committee.

18 May—The Central Committee's Historical Education Group deliberated under the leadership of Politburo member Marian Orzechowski. The 3-year achievements of the group were assessed, and the directions and problems of its continued work were described.

19 May—The group of party sociologists affiliated with the Central Committee's Department of Science, Education and Scientific-Technological Progress deliberated. The problems of the development of the social sciences were discussed. Politburo member and CC secretary, Tadeusz Porebski, participated in the deliberations.

20 May—Central Committee First Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski met with the delegation of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions with its chairman, Ni Zhifu. The following took part in the meeting: Alfred Miodowicz and first assistant to the director of the Socioeconomic Policy Department, Maciej Lubczynski.

Meetings Within Echelons and Organizations

9 May—Politburo member and Sejm Vice-President Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski met with the work crew of the "Kozienice" Power Plant.

13 May—A meeting was held in the PZPR Central Supervisory-Inspection Commission with chairmen of provincial supervisory-inspection commissions. The current socioeconomic situation in the country was discussed and proposals arising from this for the activity of the supervisory-inspection commission were detailed. The meeting was led by Politburo member and CKKR [Supervisory-Inspection Commission] chairman Wlodzimierz Mokrzyński.

16 May—The Provincial Committee [KW] in Gdansk assessed the preparations for the elections to people's councils and the implementation of socioeconomic tasks in the province during 1987 and tasks arising from the second stage of the economic reform. The deliberations were led by Politburo deputy member, Provincial Committee First Secretary Stanislaw Bejger.

—The KW in Olsztyn acquainted itself with information on the state of preparations for people's councils elections and nominated candidates for councillors to the WRN [Provincial People's Council] in the name of the PZPR.

17 May—The Provincial Committee in Biala Podlaska, Bialystok, Ciechanow, Elblag, Poznan and Skierniewice assessed the course thus far of the elections campaign to people's councils and specified the tasks of party echelons and organizations for the pre-election period. Party candidates for councillors on a provincial level were also recommended.

18 May—The KW in Bielsko-Biala discussed the determining factors of physical education and sport development in the province.

—The KW in Gorzow, Opole, Kalisz and Radom discussed the problems associated with implementing the economic reform.

—The KW in Legnica devoted its meeting to the role of basic party organizations in the area of their activity.

—The KW in Pila and in Wloclawek reviewed the problems associated with the party's cadre policy. The director of the Central Committee Cadre Policy Department, Jerzy Swiderski, took part in the plenary deliberations in Wloclawek.

—The KW in Piotrkow Trybunalski assessed the results of farming development at a joint session with WK ZSL. Politburo member, Central Committee Secretary Jan Glowczyk participated in the deliberations.

—The KW in Slupsk discussed the problem area of complaints and signals coming in from the public. The director of the Central Committee Department of Science, Education and Scientific-Technological Progress, Boguslaw Kedzia, participated in the deliberations.

—The KW in Bydgoszcz, Jelenia Gora, Katowice, Koszalin, Plock, Przemysl, Rzeszow, Szczecin, Tarnobrzeg, Tarnow, Torun, Walbrzych, Zamosc, and Zielona Gora specified the tasks of party members during the last phase of the people's councils elections and recommended PZPR members as candidates for provincial level councillors.

19 May—The KW in Sieradz discussed the tasks of the provincial party organization in the elections campaign to people's councils and nominated party candidates to the provincial people's council. The plenum released KW First Secretary Janusz Urbaniak from his duties in connection with his appointment to the post of deputy mayor of the city of Lodz. The plenum elected Miroslaw Czesny to take over the function of the KW first secretary who was recommended in the name of the Central Committee Politburo by Politburo member and Central

Committee secretary, Jozef Baryla, who participated in the meeting. The director of the Central Committee Cadre Policy Department, Jerzy Swiderski, also participated in the deliberations.

—The KW in Chelm devoted its deliberations to the strengthening of law and order and socialist ethics. The plenum also elected party candidates for WRN [Provincial People's Council] councillors.

—The KW in Kielce discussed the tasks of the provincial party organization in strengthening people's council and nominated party candidates for councillors at the provincial level. First assistant to the director of the Central Committee Socioeconomic Policy Department, Maciej Lubczynski, took part in the deliberations.

—The KW in Lomza assessed the implementation of the resolution of the provincial reports-elections conference pertaining to agriculture and the food economy. The plenum familiarized itself with information on the progress of the elections campaign to people's councils and selected party candidates for councillors to the WRN. The director of the Central Committee's Agricultural Department, Mazimierz Grzesiak, took part in the deliberations.

—The KW in Krakow, Krosno, Leszno, Lublin, Lodz, Nowy Sacz, Ostroleka, Siedlce, Suwalki and Wroclaw evaluated the course of the elections campaign to people's councils and recommended PZPR members as candidates for provincial level councillors.

—The director of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department, Slawomir Tabkowski, met in Gdansk with the presidium of the PRL Democratic Party's Seacoast Branch and with the party leadership of the GLOS WYBRZEZA daily.

Interparty Cooperation

10-17 May—A delegation of the PZPR Central Committee's Socioeconomic Policy Department headed by the department director, Marek Holdakowski, paid a visit to the People's Republic of China. The delegation met with Song Ping, Communist Party of China Central Committee Politburo member.

19 May—The director of the Central Committee's Political-Organizational Department, Stanislaw Gabrielski, received Raul Castro's advisor, Communist Party of Cuba Central Committee Second Secretary Alcybiades Hidalgo, who was visiting Poland.

9-21 May—A delegation of education-scientific workers from party scientific institutions of the Chinese Communist Party headed by Prof Han Shuying, prorector of the Central Party School, paid a visit to Poland. Professor Jarema Maciszewski, rector of the PZPR Social Science Academy conducted talks with the delegation. The delegation was received by Politburo member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Czyrek.

20 May—Politburo member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Czyrek received a delegation from the Communist Party of Sudan with its Secretary General Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud. The director of the Central Committee Foreign Department, Ernest Kucza participated in the talks.

A delegation of the PZPR Central Committee Ideological Department paid a visit to Spain headed by the director of the department, Andrzej Czyz. The delegation was received by the general secretary of Spain's Communist Party, Julio Anguete.

9853/08309

INTRABLOC

CEMA Intra-Industry Specialization Increases; Machine Industry Noted

26000618 Warsaw PRZEGLAD TECHNICZNY in Polish No 21, 22 May 88 p 23

[Text] In the early 1980's, a modern manufacturing industry based on the international socialist division [of labor] already existed in most socialist countries. Specialization and cooperation based merely on exchanging manufactures for fuels and raw materials, which stemmed, to a degree, from structural obstacles to trade, is becoming less significant.

Increasingly more significance is being attached to intra-industry international cooperation. This is specialization of individual partners in finished products of the manufacturing industry. It also includes technological specialization whereby the implementation of production programs is shaped among the cooperating parties at the level of product subassemblies, elements or assemblies, or operations which are a homogenous technological process. This always leads to cooperation, the ultimate result of which is producing a manufacture of some kind.

Specialized products and those resulting from cooperation accounted for about 22 percent of mutual exports of the CEMA countries in 1985. Specialized products dominated, whereas subcontracted products amounted only to between 10 and 15 percent of mutual deliveries in the machinebuilding industry, and even less in other production sectors. In many cases, intra-industry specialization develops more vigorously and successfully on a bilateral basis, e.g. products covered by specialization accounted for 35 to 40 percent of mutual exports between Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the GDR, and Hungary and the GDR. Meanwhile, interindustry specialization or regular commercial deliveries dominate in cooperation between the USSR and these states.

Intra-industry specialization has been developing relatively faster in the machinebuilding industry complex, consisting of dozens and hundreds of subindustries and production sectors, and in the multiproduct, highly technologically versatile chemical industry. The potential here is almost unlimited. In trade with the products of machinebuilding among the CEMA countries, 40 percent of export deliveries are carried out on the basis of bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements, and in the chemical industry—almost 29 percent. Specialization is less widespread in the iron and steel industry, nonferrous metallurgy, construction materials, pulp and paper, food processing and light industries.

Intra-industry specialization and cooperation lag the most in the light industry, which produces mainly for the domestic market, and in which exports (10 to 15 percent) and imports (15 to 20 percent) account for small shares of output. Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania are

the main exporters of leather footwear; Bulgaria, the GDR and Czechoslovakia—of knitted goods; the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania—of cotton products; the GDR and Hungary—of silk products. On the other hand, assortment specialization in market goods, taking into account the quality standard of goods (mass-produced, cheaper vs. "luxury," many times more expensive ones), is typical in world trade.

At the same time, the level of self-sufficiency is very high, e.g. in fabrics and leather footwear it approximates 90 percent of demand. This impedes the exchange of manufactures and semifinished products, hampers mutual exchange of standard, modest-quality goods, causes competition among producers and impacts unfavorably on the choice of standard products.

Thus far, international intra-industry specialization and cooperation have developed mostly in an extensive manner: still more agreements have been signed and the assortment of deliveries within the framework of cooperation has been enhanced. There are over 600 bilateral and 120 multilateral agreements. The extensive nature of this process, which is primarily expressed in statistics as the numerical growth of exchange under specialization, is based mainly on including the products delivered within the framework of conventional trade into specialization and cooperation agreements.

However, the fast growth in deliveries of products covered by specialization agreements occurred against the background of a slower [growth] rate in general trade turnover among the CEMA countries, including that in machinery and equipment. The influence of international specialization and cooperation on the repatterning of the branch structure in entire industrial complexes and on their mutual adjustment was weak. Numerous specialization agreements did not radically resolve the issue of renewing production on the basis of up-to-date technologies, because they insured only a planned sale of goods, and then only in the mutual market. Economic conditions for specialization could not be coordinated due to great differences between domestic prices and those in international trade. The scientific-technical standards and the quality of goods offered were not adequate. There is still no certainty as to meeting the deadlines and the size of deliveries, i.e. no guarantee for the purchaser. A country specializing in the production of certain assemblies, subassemblies or elements frequently lost interest in further cooperation, seeing no opportunity to enter third country markets with the finished goods. Specialized products were often not competitive in the world market, despite being traded between CEMA countries at prices approximating or even exceeding world prices.

Additions to the array of products in the environment of scientific-technical revolution, caused by a vigorous increase in the number of inventions and technical innovations and an abrupt increase in new needs, are made much faster than starting up new production

facilities. Enhancing intra-industry cooperation is, to a degree, a way to overcome the negative consequences of the infamous noncomplementary structures [of the economy in different East European countries]. Creation of centers for international cooperation of sorts is another avenue. This involves forming in the CEMA countries a unified base of elements for the machinebuilding, chemical, light and other industries, or, in other words, "the infrastructure of cooperation."

In many cases, the most up-to-date interindustry production of CEMA countries could probably function in the form of joint enterprises, including those in border areas. The interested countries propose to create, by a joint effort, large enterprises producing universal subassemblies for household appliances (compressors, evaporators and electric engines for refrigerators, freezers and washers). In light industry, it would be feasible, for example, to organize several large modern enterprises producing textured yarn, the shortage of which is affecting all, as well as plants producing synthetic sewing thread, which would make it possible to improve the quality of knitted goods and clothing.

Cooperation in the course of developing and implementing scientific-technical projects, the so-called sectoral programs, provides the best prerequisites for developing intra-industry cooperation. The CEMA countries have experience in such cooperation (in producing machinery for nuclear power generation, in creating a unified computer system, in space research). This experience is now used in implementing general agreements on multilateral cooperation in designing and starting up specialized and cooperative production of industrial robots, flexible production systems, microprocessor technology, etc. In those instances, cooperation is based on agreements on joint, specialized and cooperative production of agreed-upon product groups using unified up-to-date technology, on the basis of unified designs and technological documentation, and standardized blocks, subassemblies and elements.

9761

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

GDR's Limited Export Capacity Inhibits Inner-German Trade

23000153 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 25 Aug 88 p 12

["Ke." report: "Trade Shows Clear Evidence of Structural Weaknesses; Leipzig Autumn Fair Promises New Business"]

[Text] Any hopes of reviving inner-German trade have been dispelled. With only days before the opening of the Autumn Leipzig Fair, it is clear that in 1988 trade between the GDR and the FRG—for the third consecutive year—will once again be in decline. According to reports provided by the FRG's Economics Ministry, as

early as the first half of this year the volume of inner-German trade had dropped by 5 percent to a level of 6.75 billion Accounting Units (DM). Even were this deficit to diminish in the second half of the year, nothing would change with regard to these trade problems.

Clearly these midyear statistics bring to light the structural weaknesses which hinder trade between the two German states. Certainly—when compared with this same time-period for the previous year—the GDR was able to increase its exports to the FRG by 6 percent to a level of 3.6 billion Accounting Units, but this was once again only possible because the Republic increased its exports of raw materials and producer goods. Meanwhile, the volume of GDR consumer goods and capital goods being purchased by FRG enterprises has either stagnated or is sinking. East Berlin's goal of turning its current inner-German trade deficit into a surplus, as in the past, can be achieved not through increased export of its own higher priced products, but rather by reducing imports from the FRG. Here, however, is where it becomes apparent to what extent the "other" Germany must struggle with severe difficulties (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 23 August). Thus, over the past 6 months direct imports to the GDR have shrunk by 15 percent to a level of 3.14 billion Accounting Units. And certainly this decline cannot be made up by the GDR's so-called triangular transactions—a means of importing FRG goods via third countries where accounts are handled in other currencies. The volume of this trade has nearly doubled from DM170 million to DM300 million.

Nevertheless, the 780 exhibitors from the FRG are not traveling to Leipzig without hopes of making new business deals. For example, it is entirely possible that in 1988 the initial contracts might be concluded for the delivery of processing equipment for environmental protection. It is also possible that at this Leipzig Fair the FRG and GDR steel producers may agree on extending the current agreement on commissioned steel-rolling until 1994. Here an increase in volume of 20 percent is conceivable, since in addition to the Salzgitter AG and Hoesch, Thyssen also wishes to participate. In the GDR, current manufacturing permits—granted to such firms as Schiesser, Triumph, Adidas and Salamander—will soon be expanded to include production of car radios. Negotiations are already under way between the GDR and Blaupunkt.

POLAND

Skierniewice Holds Direct Economic Talks With Soviet Oblast, GDR

26000539d Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
15 Jun 88 p 6

[PAP report: "Commercial Cooperation by Skierniewice With Kurski and Gera"]

[Text] Sales and purchase transactions worth about 2 million rubles were contracted between the retailers of Skierniewice Voivodship and the Kurski Oblast in the

USSR. Skierniewice receives canned fish, cloth, under clothing, eating utensils, cameras, pressure cookers, flooring, bicycles. In return Skierniewice sends handicrafts and products from Polonia firms: chiefly cosmetics, artificial jewelry, hosiery, women's shoes and athletic shoes. A few power generators were also bought from the Kurski Oblast as backup energy sources for bakeries and butchers. At the border fair in Brest-Litovsk, a contract for shipment of two power shovels for melioration to Skierniewice enterprises in exchange for horticulture machinery and equipment was signed in May 1988.

The Skierniewice region also conducts direct trade with Gera in the GDR. Skierniewice receives, among other things, shoes, blankets, men and women's underclothing, towels, bath towels, tents, immersion heaters, dryers, cable for television antennas. In return Gera purchases agricultural and food articles, hosiery, vases, trays, candle holders, women's clothing, and perfumes produced by Polonia firms.

"This trade, which is increasing each year, is a valuable way of supplementing and enriching the market thanks to cooperation by sister regions," said Ryszard Marcinkowski, director of the Department of Trade and Services at Warsaw University. Moreover, Skierniewice exports only surplus goods.

13021

Poznan Trade Fair Produces More International Agreements

26000538b Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
15 Jun 88 p 2

[Three reports: "The 60th Poznan International Fair: Our Largest Partner, the USSR"]

[Text] Poznan—On the third day of the Poznan International Fair important contracts were signed by Polish and Soviet partners.

The Metronex Foreign Trade Enterprise signed a contract with Soyuzzagrapribor, Elektronintorg, Velmag, Elektrongtekhnik, and Tekhsnabekspost to exchange electrical calculating equipment valued at 370 million rubles (74 billion zloty); exports to the Soviet Union are valued at 345 million rubles (69 billion zloty).

Metalexport also signed an interesting contract with Stankolimport to export lathes, automatic polishers, and electromagnetic clutches valued at more than 117 million rubles.

Poznan—On 14 June 1988, Wladyslaw Gwiazda, minister for foreign economic cooperation, received Oliver Munyaradzi, Zimbabwe's minister of trade. Minister

Gwiazda also held talks with a delegation from Iraq, lead by Taher Mohammed Jassoun Al-Marzouk, minister of construction, and met with Cze Zur Gyn, DPRK minister of foreign trade.

On 14 June 1988, there was a meeting of the management of the Poznan International Fair with representatives of foreign industry and chambers of commerce, of enterprises promoting and developing Poland's economic relations with the world, and of trade and fair organizations. They received medals of the 60th Poznan International Fair for developing the international fair. Among those honored with medals were the editors of the Polish Press Agency, the Interpress Press Agency, the economic editors of Polish Television and Polish Radio, and the journalists Aleksander Nowak (PAP), Henryk Heller (TRYBUNA LUDU), Wacław Rogalewicz (GAZETA POZNANSKA), Marek Przybylski (GLOS WIELKOPOLSKI), and Henryk Babendych (KURIER POLSKI).

13021

Polish Auto, Transport-Vehicle Exports to PRC Down

26000538a Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
23 Jun 88 p 1

[Article by Krystyna Szelestowska: "Polish Motor Companies at 'China Automotive 1988'"]

[Text] Beijing—Among the 100 foreign car firms at the international motor exhibition "China Automotive 1988," organized in Beijing by the Adsale organization of Hong Kong, there is a large exhibit by Polmot and the Compact Car Factory.

The exhibition of Polish motor firms has attracted the Chinese's attention as potential importers and as avid fans of four-wheel vehicles, which for private individuals still are unreachable dreams, for sales of cars, chiefly the subcompact 126p for individual buyers, are very limited. Certainly, our cars are not as modern as those of the well-known firms, but for the beginning of motorization here, the subcompact 126p is appropriate.

At the International Exhibition Center, Poland is displaying personal cars: the Polonez, in the most modern version, among others, with the extended body and electronic ignition, and the 126p in the standard version being exported to China this year. As an independent exporter, the Compact Car Factory in Bielsko-Biala has its own exhibit, deluged by the Chinese.

The offerings of Polmot also include various diagnostic equipment and garage equipment, including equipment for removing tires, which is very difficult to find in Beijing. This equipment also can be exported.

In order to save money and because it plans to develop its own motor industry, China is limiting imports of foreign cars this year. Our exporters, who have so exported to the PRC about 40,000 Polonez cars and FSO-125 cars, about 15,500 126p subcompacts, including 3,500 this year, and about 10,000 trucks, buses, and special vehicles, think that Poland will maintain its position as the second-largest supplier of vehicles to China after Japan.

13021

**Polish, FRG Trade, Economic Cooperation
Expansion Reviewed**

26000568c Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
30 Jun 88 p 4

[Article by (e): "The Desire To Revive Cooperation" under the rubric "Poland-FRG")]

[Text] (P) Economic cooperation with the FRG is highly important to Poland. In the past, the West German partner also showed interest in cooperating with our country on mutually advantageous terms. In recent years economic relations decreased owing to, among other things, the burden of our indebtedness. The visits by Deputy Prime Minister Zbigniew Szalajda to the FRG and the talks with representatives of economic and financial circles are providing a new impetus for overcoming the impasse in mutual contacts.

A significant fact was the deliberations of the intergovernmental mixed commission of both countries on economic cooperation in Hamburg, cochaired by the FRG Minister of Economy Dr Martin Bangemann and Deputy Prime Minister Szalajda.

The subject of these deliberations was the whole of economic and financial cooperation between Poland and the FRG. Important topics discussed were settling the issue of Poland's debt to the FRG and the participation of that country in modernizing and restructuring the Polish economy. The protocol accepted toward the end of the deliberations expresses the desire of both partners to resolve these problems as soon as possible and satisfactorily.

A much easier topic of the talks was the cooperation of both countries in agriculture and food industry. Here the domains of cooperation for the next few years were identified. This will be promoted by a joint agricultural consortium consisting of enterprises and financial institutions of both countries.

An important problem is industrial cooperation, above all such as would invigorate preexport production in Poland. Both sides perceive here further possibilities for intensifying cooperation and they view the results of the session as providing valuable momentum in that direction. The West German side also declared that it shall "continue to display goodwill in considering Polish

wishes and endeavor that the European Community properly allow for the interests of bilateral trade between the FRG and Poland in its trade policies."

The Polish side also drew attention to impediments in exports of services to the FRG, and concerning the issue of indebtedness it reiterated its view that the way out is to be found by fixing at a rational level the interest rates paid on the overall guaranteed debt and adapting these rates to current market rates. Deputy Prime Minister Szalajda emphasized at the press conference that Poland is desirous of meeting its debt obligations to the FRG provided that a suitable interest rate is set and on the basis of a long range restructuring of the debt such that part of the thus obtained capital could be allocated for modernizing the economy. The hosts showed their understanding of this position and promised to commit themselves in this spirit at the Club of Paris.

1386

**Academic Says Price Reform Undermined by
Government**

26000565 Poznan WPROST in Polish
No 22, 29 May 88 pp 4-5

[Interview with Henryk Mruk, deputy director of the Institute for the Economics of Domestic Trade and Services, Economics Academy in Poznan, by Piotr Grochmalski: "At the Starting Point"]

[Text]

[Question] Had I entered this cubicle, one of many stuffed into this gigantic edifice, a few years ago, I would have found here a man who had subsequently as a minister of state become the butt of derision and jokes by millions of Poles: "The [unobtainable] crispy [breakfast] rolls [promised by] Minister Krasinski!" Nowadays he is nursing his wounds far from this country, at a diplomatic post and you, his closest associate, are sitting behind his desk.

[Answer] In retrospect, please bear in mind the situation that had reigned late in 1980 and early in 1981. On the one hand, the society was tremendously sensitive to any price revisions and on the other, there was the new Administration with a still fresh memory of the fact that announcements of price increases were the dynamite which had caused the explosion of August [August 1980, the rise of Solidarity], and that they also had triggered [the worker protests of] 1970 and 1976. Hence, on the one hand, the huge allergy of the then authorities to anything connected with the increases, and on the other, their total impotence. Because practically no one had a coherent concept of how to carry out a price operation so as to make it an effective preliminary to a comprehensive economic reform.

[Question] Of course, you'll add right away that there was one exception—Professor Krasinski.

[Answer] Because that is true. That was his life's work, on which he had worked for many years. Solely because his was the only coherent concept of a price operation, it was decided to carry it out. As was said, owing to a lack of choice he was chosen.

[Question] Without the reservations due to his association with "dubious" individuals? You yourself, for example, used to be an economic adviser of the Bydgoszcz Solidarity.

[Answer] I believe that Krasinski represented a kind of political experiment, being a nonparty and unaligned man. For our conditions, he could be termed an independent. He was given a free hand in selecting his associates. And most of us were indeed linked with Solidarity. Besides, Krasinski himself, before he became a minister of state, often traveled to give lectures for members of Solidarity.

[Question] He was easy to persuade to exchange a narrow cubicle for a spacious office in Warsaw, was not he?

[Answer] The offer was very tempting. Please consider what it means to a scholar to be able to personally translate into reality his own ideas, ideas that were to breathe fresh air into a suffocating economy. Nota bene, I do not know how the custom of staffing government posts with scholars had arisen in this country. In the West there is great wonderment because we say with such pride how many professors belong to our Cabinet. Over there the dominant view is that scholars are at their best when sticking to scholarship. That may probably be quite true.

At any rate, Krasinski had almost no political experience at all. That certainly did not make his task easier; the game then being played within the government was almost completely obscure to him. Besides, not being an insider, he had hardly any interest in that game. He believed that he was expected to perform the price operation effectively, and he focused on it. And we, members of his team, working under his direction, also had believed completely in the success of that operation. We could not fail. Everything was thoroughly verified and checked. Besides, the entire operation was preceded by hundreds of polls with the object of finding out whether the society would accept it.

[Question] Except that before the price reform was to take place "something" [martial law imposed on 13 Dec 1981] happened that practically nullified the value of all the previous polls.

[Answer] The fact was that the price reform was implemented in an anomalous political and economic situation. February 1982 was a time when all the previous findings on the public mood and the ensuing forecasts of the success of the price reform proved to be so much waste paper.

[Question] Like the concept of the price reform itself?

[Answer] Let me tell you that nowhere in the world were economic reforms commenced in such conditions. And yet, despite everything that was then happening this country, despite the negative public mood, the price reform released certain economic mechanisms. It accomplished its purpose: it prepared the soil for a comprehensive restructuring of economic life in this country. Subsequent reforms did not occur, however; on the contrary, in the fall the price mechanism was blocked, controls on contract prices were introduced, a hail of punishments descended on believers in the reform, and centralized allocation of goods was restored. Moreover, as Professor Wilczynski has demonstrated, owing to actions of the government, the populace gained surplus spendable incomes, which was bound to once again disintegrate the entire economy and eliminate market surpluses. Except that neither Prof Krasinski nor any other official of the Office of Prices had any say on the the decisions that led to this state of affairs. Prof Krasinski was reduced to the role of an onlooker.

[Question] If that was how he felt, why did he remain in the government? Why did he sanction with his name measures which undermined the purpose of the price reform? What is more, he even publicly argued in favor of these measures, although he knew what their consequences would be.

[Answer] You forget whose mandate he had. I happened to be in Athens when martial law was imposed in Poland, and subsequently the price reform was introduced on 1 February. And when I viewed from that perspective what was happening in this country, I simply could not understand why the price reform was being introduced under circumstances in which it might not succeed. But later, when I returned home, after many months of conversations and life in that atmosphere, I realized that actually Krasinski had no choice.... Well, you know, one can always get up and say, "Thank you very much but have fun without me. I'm going." But there still was the question: What next? And besides there still had existed a modicum of hope that the price operation would be followed by fundamental reforms. Time passed and nothing happened, however.

[Question] Have you forgotten the dozens of new decrees then passed by the Sejm? They were supposed to lay the foundations of the new economic reality.

[Answer] Yes, but no one knew what the actual reform was actually to be like, neither the Sejm nor the government, the party, or the society. The only lucid part of the reform was the price operation. As for the rest of the economic mechanisms to which it was to be linked, it was not even outlined. Of course, there were various concepts of the reform—Baka's, Balcerowicz's, Jozefiak's. Among the economists there were sharp disputes on this subject. But all that was distant from the economic practice; it was in the clouduckoo land, not only

owing to the abstract nature of the proposed solutions but also because the government could not decide in favor of any of them and instead it reduced its activities to emergency measures and interventions. It beat around the bush, and meantime time was lost.

[Question] But ultimately Baka's concept was chosen.

[Answer] Actually, no concept was chosen. That is precisely the trouble. And that is why, after 6 years, we still are marking time at the starting point. Consider that the price reform of last February in no way differs from the price reform of February 1982. We are raising prices and taking measures to protect the lowest wage-earners, which formerly we used to term compensation payments, and that is about all, that is what our reform activities reduce to, because they are not being followed by measures to activate appropriate economic mechanisms.

[Question] But the differences seem to be substantial.

[Answer] Oh yes, the scale of the [price] increases is growing. The price of economic stagnation is growing, and somebody has to pay it. It is being paid by the society. Because so far both these price operations have resulted in reducing living standards of the people.

[Question] But the purpose of the current price operation is not to be merely price increases. This concerns attaining a market equilibrium in order to lay proper foundations for the operation of all other economic mechanisms, and not just the price mechanisms, in the economy.

[Answer] Right, except that this is exactly the same thing that was said in 1982. Krasinski was to be merely responsible for creating the price mechanism. And he did create it. But what of it when it turned out that the government, which after all in theory is supposed to be responsible for the entirety of the functioning of the economic mechanism, lacked any concept whatsoever of how the price mechanism should be linked to the other mechanisms? At present the situation is almost completely repeating itself. Another price operation has been carried out, and now the discussion of what is to be done next is continuing.

[Question] Are you not too severe in your assessment?

[Answer] When we commenced the reform our indebtedness was over US\$20 billion. Now it approaches US\$40 billion. I have a simple question: what have we accomplished during these years, for which we paid such a huge price? Did we utilize efficiently the time that we had "bought" for these billions? There is no doubt as to the answer. We lost that time on sham measures which in no wise changed the dramatic picture of the whole. Besides, to realize this it suffices to peruse the official figures in the statistical yearbook on the growth rate of the GNP. In the years 1976-1980 it averaged 3.9 percent

for the world as a whole, while in Poland it did not exceed 1.2. But now the first half of the 1980s is behind us. The current growth rate of the GNP worldwide is 2.2 percent but in our country it is 0.8. This is the first ever instance of a decline in the GNP of any country in peacetime. It is now the 12th year since our GNP growth rate has been the lowest in the world.

[Question] All this may be due to the tremendous difficulties involved in reanimating our economy.

[Answer] Or perhaps owing to the absence of any coherent concept of reform measures? Because the slogan "There is No Turning Away from the Reform" in itself is merely of propaganda value. Moreover, there is nothing to return to. Perhaps it is high time, e.g., for our parliament, in emulation of Hungary, to begin to appoint to responsible posts individuals who have their own economic program, who are capable of fighting for its implementation and withstanding political pressures, and who are ready to be completely accountable for its implementation?

1386

Factory Overhauls in Fat Industry
26000539c
15 Jun 88 p 1
A in Polish

[PAP report: "Imported ... To Supply Market: Factory Overhauls in Fat Industry"]

[Text] The employees of the plants of the fat industry worked systematically and productively over the past five months and supplied the market during this period with more than 121,000 tons of vegetable fats or 11,000 tons more than last year. Now some enterprises have begun their annual inspection and maintenance of machinery or processing lines in some divisions. Unfortunately, this means that for some time, usually two weeks, production is halted.

But with a view to maintaining reasonably good supplies of margarine and other vegetable fats for the market, the schedule of maintenance work in the entire industry has been arranged in such a way that production is stopped at each successive factory only after the completion of work in the previous one.

In order to mitigate the effects of the temporary decline in domestic supplies of margarine, the minister of the domestic market has decided to purchase additional quantities of this fat abroad. In the middle of June 1988, the first shipments of margarine contracted for in Austria and the FRG arrived in Poland. They consist of Rama and Landkost margarine in quarter and half kilogram packages. These margarines were available three years ago and were well received by our consumers.

Supplies of refined oil will remain at their current high levels. In July and August 1988 the bottlers will supply the retailers with about 11,000 tons of this fat or about 2,700 tons more than in these same months last year.

13021

High Defective Production Levels Alarm Consumer Groups

26000539b Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
15 Jun 88 pp 1, 11

[Unattributed article: "End the Lower Standard for Defect Producers: The Consumers' Federation Attacks; Who Is Responsible for the Losses of Billions; Producers of Junk Must Go Bankrupt"]

[Text] From our own correspondent—The Consumers' Federation is sounding the alarm. Production of defective goods, failure to observe the production regime and the binding standards, has recently taken on alarming proportions. Each year the amount of junk flooding our market is growing.

Just last year the State Trade Inspection questioned the quality of 6,680 items out of 114,355 examined, or 46.1 percent of the goods inspected. In the group of food articles 13,711 out of 57,359 inspected were withdrawn due to their quality, or more than 23.9 percent.

The Polish Committee of Standards, Measures, and Quality has also uncovered a high level of faulty products. Of the 7,253 products examined, 1,638, or 22.6 percent, were questioned. Of the 1,555 plants inspected last year, 837 failed to observe standards both in the production process and in transportation and storage.

In the last two years, the rate of complaints and returns increased from 1.3 percent of the total value of sales to 1.7 percent. Claims made directly by consumers on warranties also rose. In 1986, there were more 767,000 claims; in 1987, there more than 884,000.

The Central Office of Statistics estimated the absolute magnitude of the losses by producers due to low quality at 81.3 billion zloty two years ago. Last year, they amounted to more than 105.5 billion zloty. We must remember, however, that the Central Office of Statistics does not record losses caused by the exploitation of junk. It does not calculate the costs of breakdowns, non-operation, excessive energy and material consumption, inadequate durability and reliability. Comprehensive calculations made by various units point to losses many times greater than the calculations by the Central Office of Statistics.

The special worries of the Federation, voiced at the press conference on 14 June 1988, are caused by the simply catastrophic quality of food. Inspections of milk and dairy products appall everyone, not just specialists.

Careful examinations have shown that nearly 64.3 percent of the milk purchased during the first six months of this year were practically unsuited to either consumption or processing. Last year the percentage of milk was judged to be 61.7 percent; in 1986, it was 55 percent. In some voivodships, nearly all of the milk purchased should be poured out. In the Tarnobrzeg Voivodship, the proportion of milk "below standards" was 98.7 percent during the first six months; in the Kielce Voivodship, 95.5 percent; in the Radom Voivodship, 98.5 percent. In the best quality voivodship, Elblag, the percentage of contaminated milk exceeded "barely" 21.3 percent during the first six months.

But things other than milk arouse quality concerns. According to the Federation's estimates, 40 percent of the food put on the market contains toxic substances. And paradoxically, the products most dangerous to our health are significantly more expensive due to the use of additional preservatives, etc.

It is high time, the Federation shows in its extensive report, to make prices, for now official ones, closely dependent on quality. It is essential to bind the tax system, subsidies, and credits to the quality of production. It is no longer possible to tolerate one quality level for export and another for the domestic market. The Federation supports establishing quality standards at world levels. It demands that every "substitution" of the components of the standard be visible on the product label.

The Federation aims to remove the anonymous responsibility for poor quality. It is essential to apply unambiguous, personal responsibility for quality at all levels and jobs, including the highest levels of management. The Federation takes the position that wasting materials, human labor, and finished products, whose shortage is felt by the entire economy, should be treated as a serious crime against the economy and society. It should be severely punished according to the misdemeanor, labor, criminal and civil codes.

It is also essential, Franciszek Gaik, deputy chairman of the National Council of the Consumers' Federation, said at yesterday's press conference for the consumers to be able to execute their rights, cheaply and simply. This requires, however, the creation of rapid, cheap adjudication. Also, the Federation activists are demanding the ability to appear as industry experts, to be able to settle all disagreements between consumers and producers or retailers.

The Federation's proposals appear to be receiving serious treatment and consideration. Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski announced in his last speech that "The Third Congress of the Consumers' Federation has proposed a system of sharper personal responsibility, a greater variation in official prices depending on quality, sharper tax

sanctions, placing enterprises in liquidation that mass produce junk and defective goods. These are serious proposals. They should be treated as such by the governmental bodies."

13021

CD Production Company Criticizes Central Planning Blunders

26000545c Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
25-26 Jun 88 p 3

[Article by Zbigniew Siwik: "An Extraordinary Disk Player"]

[Text] Perhaps when you read these words, civilization will be experiencing another technical breakthrough: the number of compact disks coming off the production lines in the entire world is greater than the number of traditional black records with grooves for needles. A laser disk player for playing the optical disks has become the next symbol of civilization at the end of the 20th century.

Adam Ciesielski, sent to the International Fair MIDEM, has sent us a report titled "The Death of the Black Record." At this fair everything new, even reissues of old works, is published on optical disks. Just as a few years ago the world craze was video, now it is the compact disk.

An absolutely new method and technique of digital sound recording on a disk burned in with a laser, which in playback returns the recorded information with the light of another laser, makes it possible to realize the same function as the old record player, only better.

A Polish CD

When I appeared at Fonica, one copy of a Polish compact disk player was just disappearing into a wooden crate for the Poznan International Fair. In response to a question whether it is already an available product, I received the joking answer: "for whom?". For potential users, not yet. The disk player was to be shown to attract partners, chiefly foreign ones, to cooperate in mass production. Given the shortages and low technical quality of electronic subassemblies, there is no point in dreaming of independent production of such a modern, complicated piece of equipment. A laser disk player requires, among other things, highly specialized integrated circuits.

Obviously, Fonica is not waiting to search for foreign partners until the design is completed; it has made proposals for cooperation to several foreign firms. Today serious negotiations are underway with firms from capitalist countries (including one Asiatic one) and with partners from socialist countries.

"I would describe the current stage as preparations for starting mass production," said Stanislaw Baszewski. In response to a question about when a Polish disk player will appear on the market, he replied: "That depends on how quickly we sign a contract to cooperate with a foreign firm. Each of the firms with which we are negotiating has proposed slightly different terms of cooperation and the final shape of the disk player will depend on them and the date production begins. In any case the CD must go into production as quickly as possible, for soon it could be too late, since all of the producers of traditional record players are shifting to disk players."

Simulated Analyses

How does the current economic situation contribute to the position of such leaders in the technological race as Fonica? To enterprises in good financial condition, due in part to sales of their products abroad?

Fonica's exports last year were \$3 million and 34 million rubles. The Soviet market is the largest buyer of the Lodz firm's products. Among the 580,000 record players produced and the 440,000 exported, more than 340,000 went to the USSR. Only 73,000 went to the FRG, France, Holland, Italy, Spain, and Greece. If it plans to maintain or increase its position on Western markets, it must shift as quickly as possible to laser disk players. Systemic reliefs, which the enterprise received thanks to its exports, have made it possible for it to calmly plan. The firm's intellectual and technical potential (every 15th employee at Fonica has a higher education) guarantees that the employees will carry the weight of the planned technical leap.

The conditions of the enterprise's operation in our economy are, however, as you know, complicated and at best not easy.

Let's begin with the specifics. At Fonica, they have calculated that if the plant does not succeed in supplying the quantity of products equal to that of last as required as part of the extraordinary authorizations by the government, the penalties will be about 300 million zloty. Fortunately, the plan for production and export was devised so that they know today that the enterprise will be able to meet "the proper but amazing decision made at midyear," as it judged the government decision. But it has also calculated, for comparison, what would have happened if the same decision had been made a year earlier at this same time.

Export obligations were orchestrated in such a way that it would have been impossible to withdraw from them and impossible to cover with additional production. Fonica would have had to pay for the loss of 500 million zloty, and practically it would have closed up shop. It is not permissible, they think in Lodz, especially during a transition to a market system as the basic regulator of the economy, to surprise an enterprise with drastic standards at midyear. Even if these parameters or their

intent was proper. Those involved in planning exports also point out that the government in introducing such essential parameters, did not make explicit which prices to use in calculating exports. Conflicts and disagreements with bureaucrats could develop throughout the economy in this situation. Again arbitrariness has triumphed.

A Personal Evaluation

Andrzej Nowak, the head of the Economic Planning Division, says (emphasizing that it is his personal evaluation, and not the official position of the enterprise or its personnel) that "again manual control has been introduced into the mass of issues. One gets the impression that the chief goal was the desire to show that someone is capable of doing something, deciding something. Perhaps I misread it, perhaps it is the result of some strategic thinking, but it is such a high level of strategy that I cannot read its relationship with the reform of the economic mechanisms."

On the three criteria announced for judging directors, Andrzej Nowak says:

"I compare these criteria in conjunction with the economic relations of our enterprise. They look good: an increase in profits, productivity, matching wage increases with an increase in productivity. Our managers should not feel threatened. But what will happen if the government introduces some new, equally surprising criteria for directors, the enterprise, or employees? We have a large investment, paid for from our own funds, without credits. We want to buy fairly expensive machinery. What will happen if suddenly another decree appears, for example, that the purchase of expensive machinery is subject to a 500-percent stabilization tax, because it is necessary to reduce production costs and investment exposure?

"I wish to be correctly understood: a stabilization tax on unused fixed assets, empty buildings or excessive supplies of materials is perhaps proper in today's crisis (although it is extraordinary in comparison with normal judgments of losses caused by such diseconomies). But introducing them from one day to the next could bring down many enterprises. I will say more: such a tax could, in our inefficient economy, become permanently mounted into the economic mechanisms, but it should become binding a year after its announcement. It is necessary to leave enterprises a little time to gather capital for purchases of machinery, for otherwise they will begin to buy anything available in order not to pay for unused buildings.

"All this causes me to cease understanding the strategic goal. It means that the central authorities have lost my trust. For example, let's take the tax on wages: the threshold formula is antimotivational, because it makes it impossible to encourage people to greater productivity, in spite of the improvement in the enterprise's

financial performance. The individual formula in turn hampers the best workers and promotes average ones. It does not allow directors to release lazy ones and pay the hard working better for replacing those released, for the average wage subject to tax will rise."

Andrzej Nowak emphasizes that the sharpness of his judgments, like those of others who prefer to avoid the public light, derives not only from impatience with the slowness of reform, but also in part from a sense of uncertainty that the current principles and mechanisms of the reform, for example, the principle of evaluation based on profit, will be maintained. Many say that the decisive role in judging the reform, as in economics, is its bottom line. The introduction of extraordinary rights prior to introducing the law on the entrepreneurship, on partnerships, on foreign capital, etc., which have been expected for years, is seen sometimes from here as unfavorable to this bottom line. Nevertheless, the appropriateness of some of the extraordinary provisions is admitted.

The most interesting conclusion from my "working" visit at Fonica (I did not speak with the officials) was my new conviction that the extraordinary rights are not necessary for the better, the most modern, who can find partners, technology, markets, and credits. Perhaps the extraordinary rights seemed necessary because our economy as a whole is not modern and cannot shift to new technologies and, as a result, is losing contact with world markets, opportunities to export and profit. Further, as a result, it is losing the ability to develop, and, thus, it needs the extraordinary provisions.

We should not treat the production of a Polish CD (or video recorder or digital television and computer) as inessential goods for the richest, but as prerequisites essential to maintaining the entire economy at a level that ensures its contact with world markets and credit worthiness, and so ensures a return to normality.

13021

Problems with 'Market of the Means of Production,' Regulations

26000580c Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
29 Jun 88 p 3

[Interview with Czeslaw Skowronek, deputy minister, Ministry of Domestic Trade, by Bozena Papiernik]

[Text] The materials barrier is at present perhaps the main obstacle in the way of economic development, whereas the status of economic equilibrium limits the scope of operation of market mechanisms and the degree of freedom in material supply. Despite all kinds of restrictions, this year is yet another step on the road towards creating a normal market of the means of production. Which of this year's changes and modifications bring us closer to this goal? What are the difficulties

and obstacles along this road? A RZECZPOSPOLITA correspondent approached Deputy Minister of Domestic Trade Czeslaw Skowronek with a request to elaborate on these issues.

[Question] Minister, is the definition "market of the means of production" justified, given that the broad scope of rationing and priorities in material supply remain? The market, in the complete sense of the word, means the freedom of buying and selling, which in our country is overly constrained.

[Answer] Nobody is saying that our market of the means of production is a normal market, a market in the complete sense of the word; it is only embarking on normalization. So far, it has numerous shortcomings. Nonetheless, the notion of a supply-items market is justified, because the principle of buying and selling applies here after all, and, moreover, 70 percent of trading is done in contract prices. It is a fact, however, that we have not achieved the equality of the purchaser and client [sic!], that this is a market of the producer, frequently a monopolist, who, to a large degree, determines the conditions—deadlines, quantities delivered, relevant procedures and frequently also prices. Numerous weaknesses are characteristic of the market of the means of production; equilibrium is lacking in many of its segments. The status of equilibrium for various groups of raw and other materials varies, but generally the demand for producer goods exceeds the supply potential of the economy. Let me recall that the five-year plan provides for the supply of raw and other materials to grow by about 10 percent while national income grows by 18 percent.

[Question] The situation in the sphere of supply is thus predetermined; what remains is to influence the demand. What is being done to bring the market to equilibrium?

[Answer] To this end, more than just the demand is influenced. The predetermined amounts of raw and other materials supply do not at all mean that nothing in the sphere of supply can be improved. The restoration of equilibrium in the producer goods market is brought about in three ways. Firstly, by supply-oriented measures, secondly, by working to streamline the demand, and the third avenue of actions is to bring equilibrium through prices.

[Question] Let us start with supply-oriented actions. What are they about?

[Answer] The object here is to improve the breakdown of materials and finished goods, offered to ensure their adequately varied assortment, and for them to have high quality features and be adapted to the needs of customers. In this case, finished products will meet the modern standards even with reduced consumption of materials. We talk about savings, but simple methods of saving will not bring about a turnaround. It will be brought about by

the renewal of techniques and technologies, consistent introductions of new and more up-to-date generations of higher quality products, produced, however, by efficient methods. I will refer to the now classic example of reinforcing steel. If the construction sector received a wide array of steel with smaller cross-sections, their consumption would be generally smaller, and construction designs would be lighter and more functional. When we improve the assortment of the supply of raw and other materials and semi-finished products, we streamline their consumption at the same time.

[Question] To a large degree, you associate supply-oriented measures and streamlining demand with changes in the structure of production. For example, a varied assortment of iron and steel products, an entire array of "metal fancy goods," can be generated only by a modern iron and steel industry, and this is not what it is at present. To be sure, restructuring is a "to be or not to be" for many plants, but on occasion we may come to the conclusion that it is insufficiently promoted, that the economic mechanisms facilitating it are too weak.

[Answer] I would add that restructuring is not only a "to be or not to be" for many enterprises, but also for many industries and economic sectors. The object is for those of them marked by lower material- and energy-intensiveness to develop at a faster pace, and the ones which use a lot of raw materials and energy—at a slower pace. As far as the mechanisms facilitating savings or stimulating desirable changes in production are concerned, in an inflationary environment they are weakened and degenerate. This is why getting inflation under control is so important. In evaluating the management of materials by enterprises in recent years, we should mention definite progress. Between 1983 and 1986, almost one-half of the increment in production was secured due to the successful implementation of savings programs. Last year, these processes slowed down.

[Question] Exactly why? What is the explanation?

[Answer] Part of the reason is difficult climatic conditions, but only one part. The inflation factor is also important in this matter. When it trends up, it is easier to manipulate prices than actually effect savings. Nonetheless, research by the Institute for Materials Management suggests that between one-third and 40 percent of enterprises implement their savings programs successfully, even under such difficult circumstances. Putting it as briefly as possible, there is progress, but no turnaround.

[Question] Which arrangements introduced this year bring us closer to a regular, balanced market?

[Answer] An entire array of arrangements bring us there. A pronounced reduction of rationing in producer goods supply is essential. This process began last year, when the number of rationed raw and other materials was reduced from 90 to 40 groups. This year, further reductions were

made, and only 18 groups of materials are covered by mandatory brokerage now. With the exception of fuels, only 12 percent of materials and technical supplies are rationed.

[Question] Opponents say that reducing rationing will not make raw and other materials more plentiful.

[Answer] They are mistaken, because it can and will do so. Mandatory brokerage brings about stockpiling excessive reserves, aggravates and perpetuates shortages. Once you receive an allocation, you automatically buy it up. Besides, the abolition of rationing speeds up and facilitates adaptation processes in enterprises so that relations between them are based on regular commercial practices—mutually agreed contracts with negotiated prices, commissions, etc.

[Question] How do you evaluate last year's experience in getting away from rationing? Has this not caused disruptions in the market?

[Answer] The evaluation is generally favorable; disruptions did occur, but not on such a scale as to restore rationing.

[Question] Going back to other modifications made this year in the supply system...

[Answer] A reduction in centrally financed imports and the creation of the new form of hard-currency auctions for some of the units which previously used centrally financed auctions are also essential. The object is not to allocate the hard currency, but for the enterprises to increasingly rely on hard-currency self-financing. This year's measures intended to change the price structure are also important. It would be premature to evaluate them, but the highest degree of raises in fuel and energy prices should be a substantial factor in rendering the prices realistic and, consequently, restoring the balance of prices in the entire chain of supply.

[Question] Do changes made this year also embrace the organization of trade in materials?

[Answer] Yes, a lot has changed in this sphere as well. Before the reorganization of the center, most of the wholesale trade units belonged to producer organizations. At present, they are mostly under the supervision of the minister of domestic trade as their parent agency, which should reinforce the position of customers. Some of the units of wholesale trade in materials are being transferred to governors; the center retains control of strategic tasks.

[Question] Last year, a lot has been said about some of the broker organizations in such trade being unnecessary...

[Answer] "Paper" brokers, as I call them, may indeed turn out to be unnecessary. However, I would like to point out that, in the process of adapting to [actual] needs, a segment of brokerage units are transforming themselves into different organizations, entering into partnerships with producers or customers, who entrust them with supply and sales operations voluntarily and on commercial principles. Some are beginning to organize and take over the wholesale trade by enhancing the assortment of wholesale products. All is done with a view to achieving the greatest possible profit, turnover and commissions.

[Question] So, what are the most important avenues of future changes?

[Answer] Making prices realistic, further restrictions on rationing, elimination of at least one-third of the still excessive amount of preferred supply claimants. Free trade also is a means to restore equilibrium in the economy.

9761

'Best Managers' Summer Program Focuses on Enterprise Development

26000539a Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
16 Jun 88 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Summer School for Managers Issues Invitation"]

[Text] From our own correspondent—The Society for the Support of Economic Initiatives has put forward another interesting initiative. Two of its sections, in Warsaw and Zielona Gora, together with Warsaw University, have organized a summer school for the 40 best managers in Dzonkow titled "Opportunities for Developing Entrepreneurship in Poland."

Andrzej Kalwas, a lawyer and president of the Warsaw section, and Dr Leszek Konczewicz, secretary, announced that the heads of state firms, cooperatives, Polonia firms, and private firms can come to Dzonkow. The organizers are expecting experienced individuals, who have seen how difficult it is to create something new and have seen it through to the end anyway.

The main goal of the school is to transfer the maximum theoretical and practical knowledge on how to create firms in the various legally recognized forms: partnerships, cooperatives, partnerships with foreign capital, innovation-implementation units.

Among the lecturers are well-known names: Professors Jan Mujzel, Sylwester Porowski, and Andrzej Zawislak; Docents Grzegorz Domanski, Cezary Jozefiak, Jan Maciejka. A meeting with the leadership of the Society for the Support of Economic Initiatives is anticipated.

Applications will be accepted until 22 June by Dr Leszek Konczewicz (tel. in Warsaw, 32-74-19). The organizers reserve the right to select the participants themselves. Individuals who have founded or participated in the founding of an enterprise, partnership, or workshop and have been economically successful will have priority. Those who had a good idea but could not see it through, through no fault of their own, also have a chance.

13021

NBP Gives Additional Credits for Burdened Farmers, Rural Areas

26000538c Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
15 Jun 88 p 2

[PAP report: "70 Billion Zloty of Additional Credit for Agriculture"]

[Text] The decline in agricultural production last year by 5 percent, chiefly because of unfavorable atmospheric conditions and the rapidly rising production costs caused by price increases for non-agricultural articles, including manufactured production resources, worsened the economic situation of agriculture. The current situation for agriculture is also burdened by high inflation and in some regions of the country by the long drought this spring. Many farms are suffering from a shortage of financial resources for current production expenses.

This situation, as the PZPR Central Committee Politburo and the Presidium of the ZSL Chief Committee stated at their joint meeting on 7 June 1988, requires decisions ensuring improvement in the profitability of agricultural production and increasing credit for agriculture. Such actions have already been taken. The Food Industry Bank has received additional credits of 70 billion zloty from the National Bank of Poland for agriculture and the food industry.

Of this sum, as Leszek Wisniewski, vice president of the Food Industry Bank, told a PAP reporter, 10 billion zloty are earmarked for individual farms, 40 billion for socialized farms and for food-industry enterprises, 16 billion zloty for individual housing construction, and 4 billion zloty for small-scale manufacturing, to develop services. The interest rate on these credits is half the basic rate in use in the national economy.

Including the credits announced earlier, credit for agriculture and the food industry has risen 260 billion zloty in comparison with last year. In any case, as J. Wisniewski said, the president of the board of the Food Industry Bank has required the voivodship offices of the Food Industry Bank and the cooperative banks regularly to evaluate the current economic situation of individual enterprises and farms and to meet their credit needs for purchases of agricultural production resources and to use more broadly the reliefs in paying off credits included in the current regulations.

Then, will the credit needs of agriculture and the food industry for this year be fully covered?

The National Bank of Poland and the Food Industry Bank are not able to cover fully the rapidly growing need for credits, especially for investments. The need for additional credits requested by farms and food-industry enterprises and small-scale manufacturing amount to about 180 billion zloty. Gathering such additional sums requires a decision by the Sejm changing the credit plan. Moreover, much will depend on how the economic situation of agriculture and the food industry develops in the second half of the current year.

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Brigades Prove To Be 'Invigorating,' Improve Quality of Production

26000538d Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
15 Jun 88 p 11

[Unattributed article: "Brigades Are Invigorating: More Productive, Better Paid"]

[Text] Brigades have invigorated the enterprises and the workers. This was the conclusion that could be drawn from the conference on group forms of work organization in enterprises, which was held on 14 June. Its organizers were the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, the Center for Self-Management Studies, and the Institute for Labor and Social Policy. Representatives of more than 230 model plants in the introduction of new work organization shared their experiences.

Research shows that there are 5,200 brigade-partnership groups in a couple of hundred enterprises, employing in all about 400,000 individuals. Group forms of work are characterized by leaps in productivity growth during their initial period of existence, achieved by exploiting so-called simple reserves, chiefly work time, emphasized Jerzy Szreter, deputy minister for Labor and Social Policy, who chaired the conference. More than 68 percent of the employees work six days a week. The work day for all is longer than 8 hours, and in 47 percent of the cases, it lasts as much as 9 or 12 hours. After exploiting the time reserves, the groups seek ways to further increase production and wages by rationalizing the production processes.

Brigade forms of work also influence the improvement of the quality of the goods produced.

Groups with broad rights, themselves make many decisions of great significance for the condition of the enterprise. As Dr Leon Grela noted, 94.4 percent of them have the right to set their size; 74.4 percent can select their leadership; 69 percent can determine their occupational make-up; 42 percent can plan their own work; 38 percent can decide on the principles for distributing wages and other funds, etc.

But there are not just positive phenomena in the formation of groups, as Dr Zdzislaw Zaleski, among others, emphasized. Their formation is an attempt to take the easy way out, to circumvent regulations, especially tax regulations. The stilted make-up of many groups indicates that the management of the plant does not want to deepen the self-management of the employees, regarding it as a factor hampering the management's work. Many other shortcomings were mentioned: fear by middle-level supervisors that they will lose their privileged position, weak binding of work results and wages. For additional production, groups are paid 5 percent of its value, added one of the discussants; while for finding a lost object they are paid 10 percent of its value. Should we be surprised that the workers also count and is not very interested in making a greater effort?

It was emphasized that the greatest barrier to developing the brigade system is the instability of the tax regulations. The instability makes the administration periodically reduce the productivity of the work groups to keep from paying a higher tax, formerly the Vocational Mobilization and Retraining Fund and now the tax on wages above the norms.

In spite of these shortcomings, which prevent the broader dissemination of groups in enterprises, many favorable results, which are worthy of broad dissemination, have been noted.

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